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NASA seeks to reliably detect potential Earth Impactors (EI) in time to defend 
the planet by deflecting them.  Congress has given an unfunded mandate to NASA to 
lead Spaceguard, a coalition of worldwide observatories and scientists who find, track, 
and determine impact probabilities for potential EIs (Udall, 2007).  This effort fits 
within the first stages of a typical military targeting cycle, which begins by detecting 
and characterizing targets.  In the first half of this analysis, military targeting is applied 
to the EI challenge through the development of a methodology to characterize early 
warning times for different size objects.  In the second half, recommendations for 
acting on different warning time scenarios are presented, to include augmentation of 
observation technology and use of a precursor transponder implantation mission. 
An interdisciplinary approach is taken to measure the success of the Spaceguard 
efforts in increasing the warning times for approaches of variously sized bodies.  A 
multi-step method is developed, beginning with determining past and present warning 
times for asteroids entering the 0.05 AU Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit 
Intersection Distance (MOID) of Earth.  Using source data from NASA’s NEO 
Program database of close approaches, JPL’s Small Body Database, and the IAU Minor 
Planet Center, the differences between the dates of first discovery of these Potentially 
Hazardous Asteroids (PHA) and the dates of 7300 penetrations of the MOID to graph 
warning times for known PHAs’ penetration of the MOID were aggregated.  The
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method also includes the estimate of PHA discovery, rates of objects with high orbital 
uncertainties, and missed approach rates.  A discussion of potential sources for error 
and directions to take for further development of the model is included.  Finally, 
recommendations for campaigns against EIs are provided, given different warning time 
and size scenarios.   
The most significant of the conclusions is that, given current technology, and 
given the limitations of the model used, the 100-300 m size range appears to contain the 
most likely EI Spaceguard will discover with enough warning time (over 30 years) to 
take some form of action.  A counterintuitive additional conclusion is that this size 
range also may yield an object that will strike with no warning time.  Another 
conclusion is that EIs smaller than 100 m will provide negligible warning time for 
centuries.    
Targeting campaigns against the most-likely EI warning-time and size scenarios 
are discussed.  These campaigns include first, additional observation technology; 
second, an inexpensive short-termed precursor transponder mission; third, a long-term 
observation mission; fourth, a suite of simultaneous observation and mitigation 
missions, and finally, evacuation and recovery operations.  The overall conclusion is 
that additional resources should be allocated toward more robust survey technology, the 
first layer of defense, with continued development of precursor characterization-





     Prologue  
 A host of U.S. government organizations have been allocated billions of dollars 
to ensure that an adversarial nation or terrorist group never detonates a nuclear warhead 
on U.S. territory.  This mission is vital and brings correspondingly vital amounts of 
funding. Yet funding allocations towards planetary defense against multi-megaton 
asteroid strikes have been relatively trivial, despite the fact that within the past thirty 
years the world has begun to awaken to the Near Earth Object (NEO) threat.  We now 
understand that a countdown is taking place for an explosion larger than any nuclear 
device.  We do not know how long the countdown will be or where the destruction will 
take place; we only know that a NEO will strike with a Tunguska or greater-size impact 
somewhere inside the next few centuries.   
Several deadly NEOs are currently on this destructive path, their orbital 
parameters configured such that they will impact Earth with devastating results.  
Will we take the necessary steps to find these objects in time to defend ourselves 
against them?  Will we augment Spaceguard’s effort to find, and catalogue, track and 
maintain the orbits of the tens of thousands of Potentially Hazardous Asteroids (PHA)?  
Will we design campaigns of space missions to characterize, track, and later mitigate 
the incoming projectiles?  Earth-Impactors (EI) are a natural hazard that humans may 
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have the knowledge and ability to overcome, given sufficient budgetary resources.  
Political will and widespread understanding of the true nature of the threat is necessary 
to make this happen. 
Overview  
The development of a methodology for answering two questions is central to the 
first half of this thesis.  The first question the methodology is developed to answer is: 
for space mission design planning purposes, what is the most likely size of the next 
impactor with enough warning time to take substantive action against it?  Secondly, 
what will average warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID around the 
Earth be in the future?  An approach to answering these questions is developed to better 
define the specific threat from NEOs.  The approach is applied using inputs that are 
acknowledged to contain errors; however, as some inputs are refined by NASA and 
further research in the community, the method might eventually yield accurate and 
applicable results.  
The second half of this thesis uses the results from an attempted application of 
the method to provide targeting campaign recommendations.  This analysis is an 
interdisciplinary approach to the impactor problem set.  The thesis contains discussion 
throughout about the success of NASA’s NEO Program and Spaceguard and the 
revolution it has brought to providing advanced warning of an Earth Impactor.  It also 
contains a projection of what future warning times will look like as NASA’s efforts 
continue, if no new funding or technological innovations are added to the current 




The primary method used for the first section was a compilation of early 
warnings for penetrations of the 0.05 Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit 
Intersection Distance (MOID) as analogous to actual impact.  Discovery dates for all 
known PHAs came from one NASA database, and all known close approaches from 
another.  These were binned by size and time, and used to calculate the warning times 
for these close approaches.  Estimates were then made for missed approaches, or 
approaches of objects that have not been discovered, and projected discovery rates of 
new bodies.  Finally, estimates for the number of PHAs whose orbital uncertainty is too 
high to allow for long term projection were incorporated, counted them as “Level 2 
PHAs” in the model, essentially considering them to be “lost in a sense.”   
The 0.05 AU distance from the Earth is used for warning time estimates 
throughout this paper.  While there are differences between this and warning times for 
actual impact, it is used as a proxy for impacting warning times. The warning time for 
0.05 AU penetration represents the time that will be available for initial decisions for 
action against each PHA close approach to the Earth.  In a layered approach to 
planetary defense, every penetration of 0.05 AU from Earth should be considered a 
situation requiring a decision to be made.  The decisions will involve one of the 
following mission campaigns, depending on the time left, the errors in the trajectory’s 
ellipse, and resource allocation:  
1.  Ignore the penetrator for the time being.  If there are already enough 
observations to demonstrate that the incoming body will not threaten the Earth, 




2.  Focus additional ground based telescopes at the object.  If the trajectory is 
only known well enough to project out a few decades or centuries, the object might 
merit further observation to ascertain future potential as an EI. 
3.  Focus RADAR assets on the object, if the error ellipse is large enough to 
have some probability of hitting Earth or entering a gravitational keyhole, or if the 
object is large enough to cause global catastrophic damage. 
4.  Launch a precursor characterization/transponder mission.  If the uncertainty 
is low and the object has a reasonable chance of impacting, a transponder mission 
should be launched to refine the orbit of the object.  This mission might simultaneously 
characterize the objects mass, density distribution, shape, and composition. 
5.  Launch near-simultaneous observation and mitigation missions.  If the 
warning time is low and the object trajectory is uncertain enough that it has a 
reasonable possibility of impacting the Earth, it may necessitate the launch of a 
transponder-characterization-observation mission right before or at the same time as an 
attempted deflection mission.  This observation mission would also carry out post-
impact assessment of the object, analogous to USAF application of Battle Damage 
Assessment (BDA) to determine if a bombed target still remains a threat.  Following 
this post-impact assessment, the object might require further deflection attempts. 
6.  Evacuation.  If warning times are too low for deflection, ground and space-
based assets should be rapidly focused towards refining the final approach of the object, 





7.  Recovery operations.  If warning time is zero and the object strikes, NASA 
and Spaceguard will be largely out of the picture, as FEMA and other organizations 
take over. 
 Earth Impact decisions involve weighing uncertainties and risks versus 
resource allocation.  These decisions, if they begin at the outer layers of defense, can 
save time and resources later.  Therefore, with every 0.05 AU approach, a decision, 
whether automated or human, must be made within the time between detection and 
approach. With every repeated entrance within 0.05 AU of the Earth’s MOID, a 
decision to carry out one of the above steps should be taken. 
The remainder of Chapter I describes the environment by defining key terms 
used throughout, discussing the relevance of warning times, introducing Spaceguard, 
describing the policy and funding environment for the program, and providing an 
overview of the current Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA) population.  Also 
provided are estimates of damage potential for different sizes of PHAs, given 
population density distributions on the Earth; this is important for understanding the 
relevance of different sizes of EIs. 
Chapter II provides the methodology used for estimation of 0.05 AU approach 
warning times.  This includes several data points required to build the model.  Chapter 
III provides the results of the model in the form of graphs and charts of estimated future 
warning times for 0.05 AU penetrations.  It also contains a discussion of sources of 
error for the model. 
Chapter IV contains an application of the results of Chapter III.  It specifically 
contains an analysis of how a transponder mission is an important key element of the 
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layered defense approach to planetary defense, second only to ground and space-based 
observation.  Once Spaceguard finds a threatening NEO, and all ground observation 
mechanisms are exhausted, a precursor transponder mission could be critical to 
determine if the NEO is indeed an impactor.  A transponder mission, whether placed 
onto the NEO, in orbit around it, or trailing it, could provide enough orbital accuracy to 
make a final determination as to whether a potentially expensive deflection mission is 
necessary.  Additionally, should an attempt at deflection take place, a transponder-
observation mission would be vital to obtain post-deflection assessment to determine 
whether the object still threatens the Earth.  For this reason, a substantial part of 
Chapter IV addresses the transponder mission concept, to include a discussion of the 
top three winners of the Planetary Society’s Apophis Mission Design Competition for 
transponder missions.  
Chapter IV also contains a discussion of the DoD targeting cycle and its 
application against NEOs, to include how a transponder mission would fit within the 
DoD targeting cycle. The author, who spent part of his military career involved in the 
targeting campaigns of Afghanistan and Iraq, sees similarities between the targeting 
processes used in the DoD with what must be used to face the next threatening EI.  
Chapter IV  uses this concept and provides analysis and recommendations for targeting 
campaigns against EIs, given different warning times and sizes.   
Chapter V contains an overall discussion of the findings and the campaigns. The 
current vulnerabilities associated with underfunding of Spaceguard are discussed, 
focusing primarily on the long-term lack of adequate warning times for bodies smaller 
than 300 m.  It also contains an analysis of each size bin, and some final words on the 
7 
 
need for better and more observation technology.  Finally, it contains a discussion of 
future potential improvement on the methods used in this analysis. 
Key Terminology 
 Most terminology used is standard within the NEO community; however, some 
new terms had to be introduced that are specific to this model.  Key terms are as 
follows: 
 Near-Earth Object (NEO)- Asteroid or comet with perihelion distance less than 
1.3 Astronomical Units (AU) (NASA NEO-P website, 2012) 
 Near-Earth Asteroid (NEA)- The asteroid subset of NEOs; this represents the 
vast majority of NEOs (NASA NEO-P website, 2012). 
 Potentially Hazardous Asteroid (PHA)- NEA whose Minimum Orbit 
Intersection Distance (MOID) with Earth is 0.05 AU (7.5 million km)  or less and 
whose absolute magnitude is less than 22.0 (H < 22.0) (NASA NEO-P website, 2012).  
PHAs are the main focus of this study, although asteroids whose magnitudes are greater 
than 22.0 (H > 22.0) are also included. 
 Earth Impactor (EI)- Asteroid or comet that strikes the Earth (NASA NEO-P 
website, 2012).  This study  is confined to asteroids only, as they are both a more 
common danger to Earth and a more surmountable challenge.  Comets, with their 
extremely high eccentricities, are much more difficult to predict and represent a threat 
that may require several centuries of technological growth to reliably mitigate. 
 Actionable EI- For the purposes of this paper, an actionable EI is one that is 
detected with enough time to potentially take additional ground observations, 
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implement a precursor transponder mission, mitigate if necessary, and carry out a post-
mitigation assessment mission.  
 Mitigation- an attempt to reduce the threat of a possible EI.  In this paper, 
mitigation can include, and is often used interchangeably with, “deflection.” 
 Warning Time- For the purposes of this paper, Early Warning and Warning 
Time are the time between first detection and a close approach within the 0.05 AU 
MOID.  As the Spaceguard effort grows, these warning times will grow significantly 
for objects over 300 m in diameter.  Objects smaller than 300 m, as discussed in 
Chapter IV, will require improvement in observational technology to produce 
consistently long warning times. 
Known object- For the purposes of this paper, a known object is a NEA that has 
been discovered and tracked.   
Missed PHA- For the purposes of this paper, a missed PHA is a PHA that has 
passed within the 0.05 AU MOID but that has not been observed or discovered.  Such 
objects can only be estimated.  
 Missed approaches- For the purposes of this paper, missed approaches are the 
estimated number of approaches within the 0.05 AU MOID from missed PHAs.   
 Spaceguard period-  A 14 year period, for the purposes of this paper.  Because 
our analysis began with a study of the success of the Spaceguard from its congressional 
mandate in 1998 to the end of 2011 (the date of download of all data), equal 14 year 
periods are used in the future projections of approach warning times.   
 Level 1 PHAs- For the purposes of this paper, Level 1 PHAs have low 
uncertainty trajectories; these are objects with enough observational arc or observation 
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in enough oppositions that their orbital trajectories can be forward and back projected 
for the entire period of 1900-2200. 
Level 2 PHAs- For the purposes of this paper, Level 2 PHAs are high 
uncertainty PHAs.  These are objects with insufficient observations to project their 
orbits reliably more than one Spaceguard period forward or backward; in other words, 
objects whose orbits provide less than 14 years certainty in either time direction.  These 
objects cannot be back- or forward- calculated with enough certainty to know whether 
or not they will enter the 0.05 AU MOID again or have entered it in the past.  They are, 
in our model, considered “lost”.  They result from insufficient observation, and occur 
mainly in objects of high H values.  The term “Level 2” is used rather than “lost” 
however, because lost objects have other specific definitions in the NEO community.  
Timothy Spahr, head of the Minor Planet Center, explains that even though objects 
with high uncertainty are lost in the sense of not being able to point a small telescope at 
them, “they will be identified when they are accidentally re-found years later.” (T. 
Spahr, personal communication, Feb 2, 2012). 
The Relevance of Warning Times 
Warning times for earth-impacting bodies have historically been far less than 
zero.  The vast majority of small body impactor evidence has been discovered well 
after impact.  Examples of impacts that occurred without warning include the impact 50 
thousand years ago that produced Arizona’s well-preserved Meteor Crater; the impact 
65 million years ago that exterminated most dinosaur species on Earth, allowing 
mammals to rise; and the meteorite that struck the east coast of North America 35 
million years ago, resulting in the Chesapeake Bay’s location and shape (Poag, 1999, p. 
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57).   Unlike other major impacts, the recently discovered Chesapeake impact shows 
evidence of a mass extinction having occurred well after the impact; Poag conjectures 
that this counterintuitive result delayed mass extinction might have come from creating 
a “pulse of greenhouse warming in the midst of the long-term global cooling trend” 
(Poag, 1999, p. 102).  Although the theory of delayed extinction merits investigation, 
the typical multi-kilometer Earth Impactor (EI) provides no such postponement to 
Armageddon.  Each of the five largest impact-induced mass extinctions, occurring 438, 
360, 245, 208, and 65 million years ago, “decimated 50-95 percent of the species living 
at those times” (Poag, 1999, p. 83).   
However, as frightening as the stories of species-ending EIs may be, NASA 
announced at the end of 2011 that 93% of these large (> 1 km) NEOs have been found 
(Clavin & Brown, 2011) through the efforts of Spaceguard. To date, NASA has not 
found a projected collision within that set of NEOs for the next several centuries.  This 
accomplishment, and the work of scientists worldwide in support of it, should be 
considered one of the more significant achievements of recent times.  NASA could 
continue to refine its orbital prediction on these bodies out to several hundreds of 
millennia to determine if any very large body is destined to be an EI.  If such an 
impactor were found, it would be an extraordinary gift to the planet if our species could 
find a way to prevent it from eventual impact. 
At the other end of the spectrum, very small asteroids strike the Earth 
frequently.  A recent event more understandable within the human concept of time is 
the 1908 Tunguska event, a multi-megaton size explosion which, without warning, 
leveled a swath of Siberian forest.  A less threatening example was a smaller iron 
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meteorite fall in the Sikhote-Alin region of Siberia in 1948 (Morrison, 2005, p. 93).  
Another occurred in 2009, when a very small asteroid (on the order of 10 m) penetrated 
the atmosphere, detonating over an island region of Indonesia in a daytime blast with 
the energy of about 50 kilotons, roughly three times the energy of the Hiroshima atomic 
explosion.  The dust cloud remnants were easily visible from the ground and can be 
viewed on Youtube.com (Silber, 2009, p. 1).   Fortunately, the object did not penetrate 
far enough to cause any destruction, although an object only two-three times as large, 
such as the Tunguska EI, could have had a more devastating local effect. 
Warning times for approaches of asteroids that have missed the Earth have 
been, like warning times for impact, predominantly close to zero.  Every few days 
small objects approach to within the 0.05 AU of the Earth.  The growing body of 
observational evidence within the past few decades has taught us that our planet is 
swimming in an ocean of small bodies, whose impacts are shielded only by our 
relatively thin atmosphere and the vastness of space.  Many such bodies pass by 
undetected, their fleeting close approaches occurring at high velocities relative to the 
Earth, fast enough to cause enormous damage if they strike the Earth.  According to 
Daniels (2009), astronomers from the LINEAR program discovered a new 100 m 
diameter NEO on June 17, 2002 that had passed approximately 120,000 km from Earth, 
well inside the Moon’s orbit.  Daniels states, “Perhaps more alarming was the fact that 
the discovery took place three days after the asteroid flew by” (Daniels, 2009, p. 126). 
A 2008 publicly released U.S. Air Force report described a more promising 
event;  in July 2008, a binary NEO (2008 BT18) consisting of a 600 m NEO with a 200 
m smaller object passed within 6 lunar distances of Earth.  This set of NEOs, easily 
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capable of large regional devastation, was discovered in January of 2008, six months 
prior to fly by (Air Force Future Concepts and Transformation Division (AF/A8XC), 
2008, p. 9)  This is promising in that the detection actually provided time for some form 
of action, even if only evacuation.  It also raises attention to the question- what could be 
accomplished in such a short period of time?  Movies such as Armageddon display 
astronauts deploying nuclear weapons on incoming EIs with only days to weeks of 
preparation, saving the world from certain destruction.  These movies depict a situation 
in which the world knows of the EI in time for a crash mitigation program, and assumes 
that the government has such a crash mitigation program already in place.    
However, a crash mitigation programs would likely take several years to 
decades to implement.  Most of the core understanding of the required technology 
exists- launch vehicles, kinetic and nuclear impactors, precursor transponder missions- 
but assembly of such technologies in a crash effort would require time we might not 
have.  Aside from technology, the relationship of the orbit of the EI with that of the 
Earth is also critical.  As then NASA administrator Mike Griffin stated in his 2005 
Testimony to Congress: 
It is estimated that a 30-year advance warning would be required to have a 
reasonable assurance of deflecting a NEO from a collision with Earth.  Thus, if 
a future impactor were identified today, the time to explore the characteristics of 
the NEO, develop a deflection system, deliver it to the NEO, and apply the 
deflection early enough to prevent an impact, requires about a 3-decade lead 




This estimate of 30 years, while somewhat arbitrary, is loosely based on the time to 
design and implement a crash deflection mission, the transit time, and the time required 
to change the course of the asteroid.  In reality, a deflection mission could take less 
time with enough political will.  However, because of trajectory uncertainties, political 
will may not have the force necessary to press for a deflection mission without at least 
30 years of time.  The reason behind this is that additional ground observations are 
required, followed by a precursor transponder mission to determine whether the object 
will indeed impact.  Once the impact probability becomes high enough, political will 
can become strong enough to press for a crash deflection mission.  However, the time 
necessary for the added ground observations and the precursor mission will take a 
significant part of the early warning time available up.  A transponder mission alone 
might take seven years, not counting design and implementation as discussed in 
Chapter IV.  This underscores the importance of better characterization of target 
warning times and sizes.  Beyond the Hollywood and History channel portrayals, what 
is the true nature of the threat?  How big will an impactor be, and how long will we 
have to react to it?  
Preliminary Summary of Results 
Figure 1 is example of one of the results of this work- a graph of projected 0.05 
AU warning times for objects of approximately 500-1000 m diameters.   
  Charts for other size bins are found in Chapter III “Results”.  The following is 
a brief overview of what they convey.  For PHAa with diameters larger than 1000 m (as 
estimated from H values) not surprisingly, the Spaceguard effort has increased warning 
times for the majority of PHAs entering the 0.05 AU MOID to several decades, and 
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even centuries.  There is a negligible chance that the next near-term EI will come from 
this size-bin.  However, due to the species threatening nature of this size bin, efforts 
should continue to ensure that all objects in this population are eventually accounted 
for, with orbits defined well enough to project out tens of thousands of years.  It is still 
a little early in the process to declare absolute victory. 
 
Figure 1.  Histogram for 500-1000 m 0.05 AU Warning Times.   
This plot indicates that warning times prior to entry within 0.05 AU of the Earth may 
be on average greater than 30 years in the 2012-2025 Spaceguard period (purple).  
After 2054, all 500-1000 m objects are likely to provide well over 60 years warning 
time. Prediction accuracy is limited by the inputs to the methodology. 
  
For PHAs in size bin 500-1000 m (by H Value) should become actionable, 
meaning that a precursor transponder mission and/or deflection mission would be 
possible, by 2026 at current rates..  If an EI is discovered within the next 14 years, there 
is only a small chance that it will be from this part of the population, because so few are 
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left in this population relative to smaller sizes.  Most PHAs in the 300- 500 m size bin 
(as estimated from H values) will be discovered and will have well defined orbits at 
current rates by around 2040.   
 PHAs by H value that are roughly100- 300m in diameter provide a more 
complex scenario.  Even with currently high discovery rates in this size bin, the 
majority of these bodies still pass by unseen, providing virtually no warning time for 
many decades to come at current rates.  Moreover, many of these are not observed long 
enough to bring uncertainty levels down to allow for accurate future orbital predictions.  
The weaker orbital elements established therefore “only allow prediction intervals of a 
few decades or less” (S. Chesley, personal communication, January 29, 2012).   
However, there are many objects in this size bin, so there is a reasonable chance that 
the next actionable EI will be discovered in this part of the population.  So many are 
discovered that the low percentage with well-established trajectories outnumber high 
certainty discoveries in all other size bins.  Therefore, this size bin holds a reasonable 
chance of providing an EI that will have over 30 years of warning time. 
Objects smaller than 100 m have on average less than zero warning times for 
0.05 AU MOID penetrations, meaning that they are often discovered days or months 
after their close approaches.  With no technological improvements, this will continue 
for centuries due to two factors.  First, this size bin has by far the highest population of 
objects, more than all the other size bins combined.  It will therefore take a very long 
time for completion of the population, even if every discovered object had high orbital 
certainties.  Second, very few of the objects have high trajectory certainties.  While a 
high number of objects in this bin are discovered every year, only around 5% (as 
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derived later) have adequate certainty in their orbits to forward project more than a 
couple of decades, with current technology.   This bin represents by far the most likely 
from which the next surprise EI will be drawn.  But there is also a reasonable chance 
that if an actionable EI (over 30 years warning time) is discovered, it will come from 
this size bin. 
Knowing this, we can focus our action on the most likely situations in the 
next few decades, which include discovering an actionable EI within the 100-300 
m size bin, followed by the 300-500 m and 25-100 m size bins. 
These rates are for the next actionable EI, providing potentially enough time to 
react and launch a precursor or mitigation mission.  The most likely next impactor in 
absolute terms is still not actionable, and is to be found within the smallest size bin (25-
100 m).  Without significant technological advancement, these Tunguska-type events 
will provide no warning times for several centuries. 
Campaigns can be designed for each of these eventualities, and these are the 
subject of Chapter IV.  The methodology presented here does contain sources of error, 
principally in the estimates for the total number of PHAs; the results will doubtless 
therefore have some error associated with them.  It is even possible that this error could 
be magnified in some cases (as discussed in Chapter IV).  If the error turns out to be 
relatively manageable, the results could indicate that NASA should design long-term 
campaigns for objects in the 100-300 m, 300-500 m, and 25-100 m size range, in that 
order of precedence for now.   This order will change within the next 2-3 decades, as 




Long warning time targeting campaigns should first seek to increase knowledge 
of the orbital probabilities through ground observations, followed by a relatively low-
budget precursor transponder mission and, if necessary, followed by an additional more 
expensive suite of long-term (multi-year) observation missions, which would provide 
pre-and post-mitigation assessment.   
Spaceguard and the Near Earth Object Program 
Only in recent years has human technological understanding advanced to the 
point at which substantive warning of impact events has moved from the realm of 
science fiction to the truly plausible.  Such warning times have become significant for 
objects over 1000 m in diameter only during the last 14 years, since the 1998 NASA 
adoption of the Spaceguard Survey concept.  Chapman and Morrison proposed such a 
survey in 1992 in a congressionally requested NASA study (Morrison, 2005, pp. 87-
88).  This study, advocating the search for asteroids larger than 1-2 km in diameter, was 
further supported by a 1995 NASA study chaired by Gene Shoemaker, who “described 
a practical way to carry out such a Spaceguard Survey using modest-sized ground-
based telescopes equipped with modern electronic detectors and computer systems” 
(Morrison, 2005, p. 88).  NASA proceeded to establish its Near Earth Object Program 
(NEO-P) in 1998 with the congressionally mandated goal of finding 90% of NEOs over 
1000 m in diameter.   
In 2003, NASA carried out a “Study to Determine the Feasibility of Extending 
the Search for Near-Earth Objects to Smaller Limiting Diameters.”  A cross-section of 
the NEO community conducted the study, which advocated the allocation of additional 
resources to find, track, and forward project the orbits of over 90% of NEOs larger than 
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140 meters within no more than 20 years, at costs ranging between $236 million and 
$397 million.  The study emphasized that “NEO search performance is generally not 
driven by technology but rather resources.” (NASA: Near Earth Object Science 
Definition Team, 2003, p. iv) 
Following this, Congress directed NASA, without providing additional funds, to 
implement a NEO survey program, “for objects as small as 140 meters in size in the 
NASA Authorization Act of 2005.” (Udall, 2007, p. 2007)   According to Lindley 
Johnson, Program Executive for the Planetary Science Division, which oversees NEO-
P, congress allocated NASA an additional $2M in 1998 to start the program.  In all 
other years up to and including 2009, NASA took the funding for NEO-P, amounting to 
an average of $4M per year in real year dollars, out of its Planetary Science research 
and analysis budget.  In 2010, congress appropriated an additional $2M above NASA’s 
requested budget as an earmark to fund the radar operations at Arecibo (L. Johnson, 
personal communication, Feb 12, 2012), the National Science Foundation’s (NSF) 
high-powered radar in Puerto Rico.  NASA is, in effect, leading the worldwide 
planetary defense effort from its science budget. 
In FY11 NASA sought to establish a separate funding line amounting to a 400% 
increase to $20.4M for NEO-P in its budget request, although that budget was never 
acted on by congress.  At the behest of the Obama administration, NASA again put a 
separate funding line for $20.4M towards NEO-P in its FY2012 budget request to 
congress.  This support likely came because of a National Research Council (NRC) 
report published in January of 2010 that “finally convinced most everyone that more 
effort should be spent in this area”  (L. Johnson, personal communication, Feb 12, 
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2012).  Perhaps in a few hundred years, the relatively minor amounts of US 
Government funds allocated to Spaceguard will be viewed as the most cost-effective 
dollars spent on government programs in the 21st century.  However, should a 
damaging strike occur, the view would likely be that the congress and administrations 
were at fault for providing comparatively very little funding towards a significant 
mission.  Only $4 million per year (and more recently $20.4 million/yr) has been 
allocated towards discovery, tracking, modeling, and software development for the 
NEO Program.  While this sum may prevent unpredicted impacts from the large 
objects, it may not suffice to provide adequate warning for objects below 300 m in 
diameter in the near future.  The number of objects below 300 m is higher than all the 
size ranges above 300 m combined, and objects in this range can still cause local or 
regional catastrophic damage.  Furthermore, without an eventual space-based 
infrastructure, the relatively low percentage threat from comets will always be present.   
Given the minor budget allocated to Spaceguard, the results have nevertheless 
been excellent and have provided confidence that it may eventually be possible to 
predict most EIs down to 140 m with enough warning time to take action.  On Oct 6, 
2008, some immediate proof for a success of the effort came when part of the 
Spaceguard infrastructure detected 2008 TC3 19 hours before it exploded 37 km over 
the Sudan. The automated Catalina Sky Survey telescope at Mount Lemmon, Arizona, 
discovered the object, which had a magnitude H=30.9+/- 0.1, something virtually 
impossible to do 20 years prior.  Incredibly, orbital solutions from ground observations 
were able to accurately predict the location of impact in the Nubian Desert, and the 
above ground explosion was visible to eyewitnesses on the ground and US government 
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satellites (Jenniskens, 2009, p. 485).  Estimates of the size of 2008 TC3 indicate it was 
only a few meters in diameter.  It was not massive enough to strike the ground with 
substantive remaining kinetic energy, although a total of 3.95 kg of its post-explosion 
mass made it to the ground unexpectedly.  2008 TC3 is very relevant to the topic of 
warning times for one significant reason:  although no current technology could have 
mitigated this EI in the time available, the very fact that Spaceguard’s Catalina Sky 
Survey discovered 2008 TC3 prior to impact at all is inaugural.  Until then, no EI had 
ever been detected several hours prior to reaching the ground.  This detection was a 
direct result of Spaceguard’s growing capabilities, both technologically and 
organizationally. 
Detecting small bodies hours prior to impact could be vital for evacuation of a 
target area and shows immediate promise for the future.  And the Spaceguard effort is  
working to detect potential EI events years, decades, and even centuries prior to impact, 
in time to send a deflection mission, or even a precursor characterization/ observation 
mission prior to a deflection mission.   
The Relevance of Size 
The size of a threatening EI is intertwined with its warning times.  Size also 
matters for campaign plans, damage predictions for impact, evacuation plans, post 
impact recovery plans, and deflection methodology.  The population count for NEAs 
and PHAs may be inversely correlated to the diameter, with the vast majority of objects 
measuring under 100 m in diameter, and only around a thousand greater than 1 km.  
Small PHAs, while more common than large ones, are also more difficult to detect and 
track.   Small PHAs often have orbital uncertainties so high that predictions out a 
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decade or two are difficult or impossible.  In our model, these bodies with high orbital 
uncertainties are referred to as “Level 2 PHAs”; these PHAs are counted as essentially 
lost, because no adequate warning time will come with such high uncertainties.  
The Current Population 
The method and results in Chapters II and III required the use of population data 
throughout the analysis.  Much of this population data came from NEOWISE.  
NEOWISE is the asteroid detection add-on to the Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer 
(WISE) mission, which surveyed the entire celestial sky while orbiting in Low-Earth 
Orbit over the course of 12 months (NASA Press Conference, 2011). WISE was 
designed to look for stars and galaxies, but a side benefit of its scans was a large 
amount of data collection on NEOs.  WISE scanned in the infrared (IR) part of the 
spectrum. NEOWISE data shows an estimated 19,500 mid-sized (100-1000 meter) 
NEOs, potentially threatening our planet with local or regional devastation, down from 
35,000 previously estimated (NASA Press Conference, 2011).  PHAs are a subset of 
these NEOs, discussed later.  Asteroids, due to their varying albedos, can appear 
smaller to optical telescopes than they really are, and the IR scans of WISE alleviated 
this problem. The NEOWISE estimates did not apply to NEOs smaller than 100 m in 
diameter, which from previous studies are thought to number close to 1 million (NASA 
Press Conference, 2011).  Other analysis of the NEOWISE data showed that 93% of the 
larger than 1 km NEOs have been discovered. Significantly, none of these appears to 
threaten the Earth for the foreseeable future (NASA Press Conference, 2011).   Figure 2 




Figure 2.  NEO Population.    
This figure shows the total discovered objects in brown, and the total predicted objects 
in green.  Each image represents 100 objects. Previous estimates are in blue.  The 
brown and green estimates are used in this analysis.  For objects under 100 m, 
NEOWISE was not used for estimates.  Image credit (NASA/JPL-Caltech, 2011). 
 
Size bins in this study are the same sizes used in the NEOWISE program, for 
consistency.  These bins range from the largest PHAs (> 1 km) down to a minimum of 
25 m, below which most objects will burn up prior to impact.  Time bins are based on 
the period beginning with the congressionally mandated effort to find objects over 1000 
m and ending after the NEOWISE study was completed, by the end of 2011. This 14 
year period is called, for the purposes of this paper, a Spaceguard period.   
Another useful source of data for the NEO/PHA populations was the NEA Size-
Frequency Distribution chart (L. Johnson, personal communication, January 5, 2012) 
found in NASA’s 2003 NEO Science Definition Team report, as updated by Mainzer et 
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al. with the NEOWISE data in 2011.  The updated diagram, included below, gives 
several approximations of the number of objects for various sizes as well as their 
destructive energy levels and approximate impact intervals.  Different investigators 
carried out these approximations with very different methods to include the use of lunar 
cratering records, bias correction of controlled surveys, ratios of re-detections versus 
new discoveries, relative bias estimates, infrasound, and orbiting infrared sensors 
detecting bolide impacts on the upper atmosphere (NASA: Near Earth Object Science 
Definition Team, 2003, p. 17).  Results from NEOWISE indicate that the “cumulative 
size distribution is best represented by a broken power law with a slope of 1.32+/- 
below 1.5 km” (Mainzer, et al., 2011, p. 3).  This was used as the lower bound for the 
number of PHAs less than 100 m. 
Using data from the NEOWISE count in Figure 2 and the NEA Frequency 
count in Figure 3, specifically using the 1.32 power law as the lower bound and the 
constant power law as the upper for under 100 m, the following Table was produced.  
This table contains the total number of estimated NEAs and the total number of 
detected NEAs as of the end of 2011.  The third row is a simple percentage of the total 





Figure 3. NEA Frequency, Absolute Magnitude, Size, Impact Interval and Energy Plot.   
This plot shows, on the left side, the estimated number of NEAs larger than a given size.    
Also indicated are the impact intervals and impact energies for given size ranges.  H to 
size conversion at the bottom uses an albedo estimate of 0.14. Image credit (NASA NEO 
Science Definition Team as updated by Mainzer et al., 2011) 
 
Table 1. Population Overview, December 31 2011. 
 
Note: The above table provides estimates of the total NEAs in the given size ranges as well as 
the NEAs detected in those size-ranges as of the end of 2011.  The third row displays the 
percent completeness of the population. 
 
 








Estimated Total NEAs 981* 1500* 2400* 15,700* 50,000-
1M** 
NEAs Detected to date 912 1200 1100 2000 3000 
% NEAs detected  as of Dec 
2011 
93% 80% 46% 13% .6% 
* from NEOWISE graphic 




Damage Potential for Various Sizes of EIs 
 Another critical element of any thorough NEA targeting study is damage 
potential.  Understanding damage potential helps us to understand better what courses 
of action should be taken given different warning time scenarios.   
 Impacts by NEAs larger than 1 km are both extremely devastating and 
extremely rare.  Most of these objects have been found, and none of those found are on 
path to strike our planet for at least several centuries.  If such an object did strike, the 
impact would be the “destruction of a region or ocean rim; potential worldwide climate 
shock, approaching global civilization destruction level” (Chapman, 2003, p. 3).  The 
object that killed off the dinosaurs after their very long reign was potentially 6 km in 
diameter, although its size varies by study.   NEAs in the 500-1000 m range would also 
be devastating on both land and water at the regional if not global scale, depending 
upon which end of that size bin an EI comes from.   
 NEAs in the 300-500 m range can create a large, deep crater on land and 
devastation for a small nation (Chapman, 2003, p. 3).  They could cause considerable 
damage to a large nation, depending on the size, density, composition, entry angle, and 
velocity.   The effects also depend greatly on whether the impact takes place in a 
populated area or rural area.  A water strike from a NEO in this range anywhere in the 
Atlantic could “devastate the coasts on both sides of the ocean by a tsunami over 100 
meters high” (Hills, 1997, p. 1) 
 NEAs between 100 and 300 m in size have the capacity to create a devastating 
air burst or a strike on the ground or ocean. A 200 m object contains the energy of 600 
MT of TNT, the size of several of the largest nuclear weapons ever tested.  On land, 
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this would create “an enormous crater, 3 to 4 km across and deeper than the Grand 
Canyon” (Chapman, 2003, p. 10).  The death toll could range from the thousands to 
millions.  Ocean strikes are more likely because oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth’s 
surface.  A 200 m object striking the ocean could generate a tsunami in the 10 m range, 
“comparable to the biggest ocean-wide tsunami recorded during recent centuries,” 
(Chapman, 2003, p. 10), although Ward and Asphaug’s model shows that waves may 
reach even as high as several hundred meters (Ward, 2000, p. 21).  Because a large 
percentage of the world’s populations live in coastal areas, an ocean strike could cause 
significant casualties. 
 NEAs in the 25- 100 m range can cause Tunguska size devastation.  The 
damage will vary greatly, as does the strike frequency; a 30 m stony meteorite will not 
bring near the devastation of a 30 m iron meteorite, which are significantly rarer, on the 
order of 6% of falls (Emiliani, 1992, p. 152)  Objects in this range, which constitute the 
most frequent EIs, might damage or destroy on the order of 2,000 square km, as was 
the case with Tunguska (Chapman, 2003, p. 12).  These strikes happen frequently, once 
every few centuries, but without an order of magnitude leap in technology, they are 
likely to occur without warning.  A saving grace is that water impacts, at least at the 
lower end of this range, likely do negligible damage. (Chapman, 2003, p. 12)  Also, 
because the radius of damage is lower for smaller impactors, there is a reasonable 
chance that an airburst over land would happen in a relatively unpopulated area. This 
happened with Tunguska, but since 1908, human population has increased in many 




comprehensive modeling is required to give an accurate answer as to the danger of a 
smaller strike.   
Accurate damage/death estimates could come from models used by the US 
Government (e.g. the Defense Threat Reduction Agency or the Department of Energy) 
for modeling nuclear air-blast fatalities.  Such models generally use population layers 
and are more reliable than simple estimates of either inhabitable or arable land.  
Without such a model, simple estimates are possible by using available population 
predictions for urban and rural areas, but the error is much greater.   
The use of estimates of “arable” land is tempting; however, such estimates 
would likely contain a great deal of error, because today’s population extends to a 
substantial portion of non-arable land.  The United Nations projects that by 2030 some 
1.1% of total land area, or a little over 1 million square kilometers, will contain 5 
billion people (as cited in Angel 2005, p. 1).  Assuming that NEAs have essentially the 
same chance of striking anywhere on the Earth, this represents a .3% chance that an air 
burst will happen over an area with average population density from 3-8,000 people per 
square km.  A very low probability percentage strike above a city, therefore, could 
cause casualties on the order of 6-16 million people.  The remaining land area will 
contain the other approximately 3 billion people, with very low density distributions 
from 0-1000+ people per km square.  
 Large swathes of land in Canada, Russia, and Australia are primarily 
uninhabited.  These areas take up some 34.5 million km2 of the available land mass.  
Antarctica makes up another 14 million km2, and with a few much smaller countries 
added in, the total land area with 0-10 population density/ km2 people amounts to 
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roughly 60 million km2, or 41% of available land.  There is a 12% chance of a strike in 
these areas.  The other 59% of land (17% of surface area) has a large range of 
population densities. The following chart is a compilation of these data for a 25-100 m 
strike, with current population estimates (2011-2012).  It should be noted that with 
rapidly rising populations, both the population density and areas with higher population 
densities will likely increase. 
Table 2. Casualty/Damage Potential 25-100 m (2011). 
Area Chance of Strike Potential Casualties/Damage 
Water 70.9% Little or no death/damage 
Sparsely populated land 
(0-50/ km2) 
12.1% 0- 100,000 deaths/ little to no 
damage 
Lightly to Moderately 
populated 




0.3% 6-16 million deaths, billions of 
$$ in infrastructure damage 
 
Note: The above chart displays the current chance for strikes over water, sparsely 
populated land, lightly to moderately populated land, and heavily populated land.  The 
third column displays the casualty and damage potential.  A more robust model could 
be generated using DoD or DoE models containing population and weather layers.  
With the current population explosion, these numbers will increase. 
 
As seen from the above table, although the chances are highest for an 
undetected 25-100 m strike within the next few centuries, the chance for the “perfect 
storm”, or a strike on a highly populated area, is less than 1%.  However, with growing 






Steps to the Method 
 The following describes the method used to determine the most likely size range 
containing the next EI with enough warning time to be actionable.  It is also the method 
by which warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID around the Earth are 
developed in this model.  In the process, the success of Spaceguard over the past 14 
years is characterized, and the outcome of the next similar size periods is projected.  
This database analysis was carried out and then used the conclusions to formulate basic 
mission campaigns for the most likely scenarios.   
 First, the planetary defense problem set was related to layered defense strategies 
used in the US military.  Discovery and tracking and predictive analysis are the most 
crucial and first of the layers in planetary defense, followed by the use of in situ 
transponder missions to characterize the PHA and provide refined orbital parameters.  
Secondly, the situation of a PHA only detected on its last orbit prior to strike is 
examined.  Then warning times for entry into the 0.05 AU MOID as a corollary to 
actual EI warning times are examined.   
 The 0.05 AU MOID warning times were derived by compiling all of the times 
between first detection and each approach within the 0.05 AU MOID for “known” 
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objects.  These known objects have been detected already and have orbits which have 
been forward and backward projected between 1900-2200, depending upon the 
uncertainties in the orbits.  Past and recent rates for detection of new objects were 
analyzed and forward projected over several decades.  Next, an analysis of the typical 
percentage of objects that have high uncertainty was accomplished.  In this model, they 
are considered lost because their future penetrations of 0.05 AU cannot be reliably 
predicted past a few years.  Following this, estimates for how many approaches within 
the MOID are entirely missed in an average 14 year Spaceguard period are made.  
These are called “missed approaches.”  Many very small objects come fairly close to 
the Earth without our knowing it.  The number of missed approaches will decrease as 
more NEAs are discovered.  Finally, all of the above data is compiled into histograms 
of 0.05 AU warning times for each size bin.   
Layered Planetary Defense 
Rather than relying purely on technical means to detect a NEA on its last 
approach prior to impact, the “layered” approach to planetary defense provides a more 
robust result.  This approach to planetary defense falls in line with defense mechanisms 
for any physical security found in the military.  For example, airbase security might be 
divided into layers, with the outer layer stopping the majority of significant attacks, 
through information collected on potential threats.   If information fails to alert security 
forces far enough in advance, the base perimeter might be construed as the next layer of 
defense.  Following this, an individual building’s security mechanisms, followed by, 
for example, security on individual computers or for individual rooms.  The most 




Figure 4. Example of Layered Defense for Airbase Security. 
 
This analogue is used to design a similar approach to Planetary Defense.  Here, 
the outer layers encompass information gathering against NEOs, to determine the 
general population of objects whose q values are less than 1.3 AU.  Next is another 
informational layer, the subgroup of NEAs which come within 0.05 AU of the Earth 
called PHAs.  A third informational layer is radar imaging for refinement of orbits, 
when possible.  When an object provides a reasonable probability of being an EI, 
RADAR imaging is a logical tool for refining the probabilities of impact.  One of the 
probabilities required is for the likelihood that an object will enter a gravitational 
keyhole with Earth, whereby the Earth’s gravity interacts with the PHA such that it has 
a significant increase in the likelihood of impact on subsequent approaches.  Each 
object has its own “personal” keyhole, whose calculations help determine the ultimate 




Figure 5.  Layered Defense Applied to Planetary Defense. 
 
If, through the first three “informational” layers, an object is determined to have 
a reasonable likelihood of striking the Earth, the next layer of defense comes into play- 
that of finding a very precise orbit and characterization data through a precursor 
characterization/transponder mission.  This mission, costing less than $300 M, could 
save billions of dollars by demonstrating conclusively that a large-scale mitigation 
mission is unnecessary.  Moreover, if a precursor mission determines that the likelihood 
of impact is even higher than originally estimated through ground observation, 
deflection attempts are the next layer of defense.  A host of deflection mechanisms 
have been theorized, to include nuclear, kinetic, and slower mechanisms such as gravity 
tractors and propulsion systems.  Should deflection attempts prove unsuccessful, the 
next layer of defense is evacuation of areas most likely to receive the unwelcome 
impactor.  If an object is detected a few days or weeks prior to impact, it may be 
possible to calculate the likely location of impact to at least attempt evacuation.    
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Planetary Defense Only Using Last Approach 
 
 
Figure 6.  Planetary Defense Only Using Last Approach.   
This chart from Doomsday Asteroid (1996) shows how typical observations can yield 
poor results if warning time is only a function of detection technology on the last pass.   
The asteroid is the dotted loop; each dot corresponds to one month of its orbit, so the 
dots cover are close together at aphelion, corresponding to higher velocities.  (Cox & 
Chestek, 1996) 
 
As Cox and Chestek (1996) explain, if we trace back from the impact, we will 
see that by only observing during opposition, observation of the EI is only possible 
around one, two, or three months before impact, using the midnight direction.  
“However, the gray, two-headed arrow shows the direction in which we should have 
been looking nine months before impact to see the asteroid” (Cox & Chestek, 1996, p. 
98).  But this would require a space-based telescope.  The double-sided arrow in Figure 
6 corresponds to where the Earth and asteroid are at nine months prior to impact.  
“Note that an Earth-based telescope would be in daylight, facing the sun (the “O” in the 
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diagram), and therefore would be blinded by it.” (Cox & Chestek, 1996, p. 99)  If a 
spacecraft was positioned several months ahead of the Earth’s orbit, for example, at the 
T-4 arrow (corresponding to four months prior to impact) on the chart, it could increase 
the warning time for the last pass prior to impact substantially.   
This diagram shows how even now, ground-based observations will at best 
yield a few months warning time if the EI strikes on the first observed pass.  
Fortunately, this is an unlikely phenomenon for large objects, which have mostly been 
detected and pose no immediate hazard.  However, it is a possible outcome for objects 
smaller than 300 m.   
Space-based mechanisms could increase the final approach warning times for 
EIs by several months.  As Cox and Chestek point out, an early warning telescope, 
positioned three months ahead of the Earth, could provide six months of warning for a 
PHA that would normally provide only two months of warning (Cox & Chestek, 1996, 
p. 110).  Lindley Johnson, Director of NASA’s Discovery Program Office and NEO 
Program, cited the possibility of placing a space-based asset in a Venus orbit looking 
out to increase NEO detection success (L. Johnson, personal communication, January 
5, 2012).  Even a few months more warning time would at the very least allow for 
greater trajectory resolution, impact location predictions, and planned evacuations.  





Layered Defense: Using the 0.05 AU MOID 
After examining the “detection on last approach” warning time scenario, we 
next examined the more manageable (but still difficult) process Spaceguard has 
undertaken of finding as many objects as possible, in the hopes of detecting an EI well 
before its last approach.  This section contains the next step- producing graphical 
representations of past and present warning times for asteroids entering the 0.05 
Astronomical Unit (AU) Minimum Orbit Intersection Distance (MOID) of Earth.  This 
MOID is a spherical region, similar to that of the Earth’s surface.  (Note:  It may be 
possible to obtain more precise estimates by using a portion of the MOID, close to the 
ecliptic, due to the fact that objects with higher inclination may be less apt to strike the 
Earth (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 20 Apr 2012). 
Penetration of this spherical MOID around the Earth should be viewed as a 
critical event.  Warning time to this critical event is in some ways analogous to warning 
times for impact with the Earth.  However, because the body does not actually strike 
the Earth, this warning time should be considered the amount of time available for a 
decision to be made- whether to focus more observational assets on the body, send a 
precursor to it, or other orbital refinement techniques. 
  For this part of the analysis, data for 7,300 predicted and past close approaches 
within the 0.05 AU MOID were combined with the dates of first discovery of these 
asteroids.  The source data came from NASA’s NEO Program database of close 
approaches (NASA NEO- Program, 2011), JPL’s Small Body Database (NASA JPL, 
2011), and the International Astronomical Union Minor Planet Center (IAU MPC, 
2011).  The dates of discovery were then subtracted from the dates of close approach 
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for each penetration of the MOID.  The main spreadsheet was then divided into 
separate bins by size, and the results graphed.  Figure 7 illustrates the concept: 
 
 
Figure 7.  Visualization of 0.05 AU Approach Warning Time. 
The offending NEA is in the upper left-hand corner.  Subtracting the date of discovery 
from the date of close approach provides the warning time for this approach.  While not 
an exact analogue to EI warning time, it gives us a defined period of time for decided 
action or inaction. 
Data Sources for NEA Warning Time Analysis 
Downloaded data included all approaches for NEAs projected to fly within 0.05 
AUs of Earth between 1900 and 2200.  The initial data came from NASA’s NEO-P 
website, which gives options for downloading NEA data for different H magnitudes, 
distances from Earth, and timeframes.  NEOs that enter within 0.05 AU were chosen 
because of the standard international definition of PHAs.  Also, the size of the database 
for 0.05 AU penetrations, while large, is possible to work with using Microsoft Excel.  
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Although objects smaller than 150 m are not defined as PHAs, data were utilized for all 
sizes of NEAs, to include those below 150 m.   
Size-Albedo-Absolute Magnitude Relationship 
After bringing data for all PHAs into our Microsoft Excel database (to include 
those objects smaller than 150 m), conversion of the absolute magnitude to an 
estimated diameter for the objects was carried out.  Absolute magnitude is defined as 
the “visual magnitude an observer would record if the asteroid were placed one AU 
away, and one AU from the Sun and at a zero phase angle (NEO-P, 2012)   The 
standard conversion formula was used, relating absolute magnitude (H), albedo (p), and 
the diameter of an assumed homogeneous spherical object, as used by NASA JPL 
(Chesley S. C., 2002, p. 425):   
Equation 1 





The relationship between the diameter and magnitude are an approximation.   
Bowell et al. explains, “the principal source of error in the size of the object generally 
arises from the albedo uncertainty.  However, the computed value of H can easily be 
wrong by a half magnitude or more since several simplifying assumptions are made 
about the object’s phase relation” (as cited in Chesley, 2002, p. 3).   NEOWISE has 
demonstrated that in the infrared part of the spectrum, NEOs which appear very small 
visually may actually be very large objects with low reflectivity (albedo).  Objects with 
very high reflectivity may, in contrast, be estimated as larger than they actually are.  
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We may see, with visual observation, only the tip of the ice berg.  Figure 8 from  
NEOWISE illustrates the difference between visible light and infrared light emitted by 
a set of NEOs. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Visible versus IR Asteroid Size.   
Here we see that a dark object such as charcoal would, in visible light, look the same 
size as a much smaller chalk object.  However, in the IR, charcoal radiates much more 
heat, giving it a signature comparable to its size. (NASA/JPL-Caltech, 2011) 
 
H value is inversely related to size, all other things being constant (equal 
albedos).  For objects of equal albedo, high H values correspond to small objects, and 
low H Values correspond to larger objects.  The issue is that albedos for NEAs are far 
from equal and are estimated to cluster around 0.05 and 0.25 (NASA NEO-P website, 
2012).  Average albedos used on NASA’s NEO-P website previously assumed a mean 
albedo for NEAs of 0.11, which meant that a corresponding H value for a one km NEA 
was H= 18.0.  According to NASA’s Planetary Science Division Program Executive,  
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the database was changed in recent years to reflect an updated estimate for average 
albedo to .14 for NEAs, carried out by J.S. Stuart in 2003 (L. Johnson, personal 
communication, January 5, 2012).  Using equation 1, this establishes an absolute 
magnitude of 17.75 +/-.1 for diameters of 1 km, vice the previously used H = 18.0.  
This means, essentially, that NEOs may be slightly smaller on average than previously 
understood.  However, the type of asteroid is important when looking at albedos.  A 
more comprehensive method for accomplishing warning time estimates might look at 
the population of types of asteroids, using average albedos for each type, rather than for 
the entire population. 
 With the average albedo of 0.14 and H values from the NEO-P database, 
equation 1 was used to populate the spreadsheet with estimated sizes of our objects 
(NEO-P, 2012).  Objects were then separated out into the size bins of >1 km, 500- 1000 
m, 300-500 m, 100-300 m, 25-100 m, and <25 m. 
Inserting Dates of First Observation 
Next, data with the following parameters were downloaded from the JPL Small 
Body Database Engine into a separate workbook:  full name, primary designation, first 
observation date, last observation date, magnitude (H), and MOID (AU) (NASA JPL, 
2011).  The full name and primary designation were both included to make sure the two 
databases matched accurately.  First observation date is the date when the PHA is first 
discovered.  Last observation date was not used for this analysis; however, it was 
downloaded along with several related data elements for potential future work on the 
relationship between observation arc length and uncertainties.  The MOID data was the 
distance from a MOID around the Earth; all objects whose MOID was less than 0.05 
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AU were downloaded.   Manually combining the Small Body Database data with the 
NEO-P data to produce a single database took several weeks due to the differences in 
the way the data is arranged.  The resulting single database contained the name of the 
object, its primary designation, its magnitude, the date of first observation for each 
object and the date for each approach within 0.05 AU.   
Detection-to-Approach Times for Known Objects 
 Using the combined database, the dates of first known observation and closest 
known approach dates were converted to a format suitable in Excel for subtraction.   
The next step was the subtraction of dates of first observation from the approach dates, 
and conversion of this to a time value.  This difference, whether negative or positive, 
represents the warning time for each close approach.  These objects are called known 
objects, and their corresponding approaches are called known approaches, because they 
have been discovered.   




Note: Table 3 portrays four approach events, but only two NEAs.  NEA 2003 RB was 
discovered in February of 2002 and has a calculated close approach 68.58 years later in 2070.  
NEA 2002 CU11 has three close approaches shown in the table.  The event in 1983 had a 
negative warning time, meaning the object was only observed 18.45 years after that close 
approach event.  In 2014, however, 2002 CU11 has a close approach event with 12.57 years of 
warning time, within which a decision for further observation or greater action could be made. 
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  Subtraction of the dates of discovery for the 7300 close approaches from 
their dates for close approach within the .05 AU MOID was then accomplished.  
The following is an example of four approach events from that combined spreadsheet 
of 7,300 events; the electronic version of the full spreadsheet is available on request: 
 
Figure 9.  Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (D>1000m). 
We can see from this figure that for objects with H values less than 17.75, corresponding 
roughly to diameters greater than 1 km, the warning times for known approaches between 
1984-1997 were most often less than 1 year, with several objects detected only years after they 
passed by.  In the second period, all approaches were known about prior to penetration in this 
size range. 
There is a slight shift to the right in these warning times, which is to be 
expected due to better technology.  NEA detection is not static; the technology has 
increased dramatically, and the focus on the problem set has as well.  Because 
technology has increased and resources have been allocated towards the NEO problem 
set, the warning times appear to have increased between the two periods.  In effect, the 
above graph measures some of the effect of improved technology on warning times.  
However, this chart (and the next three), do not contain estimates for missed 
approaches or high uncertainty trajectory objects.  That will follow in Chapter III, 
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Results, which compiles the above data with missed approaches, trajectory 
uncertainties, and the projection of future discovery rates. 
Objects in the other size ranges all show the same trend towards greater warning 
time, due to the increased efforts and technology of Spaceguard.  The following figure 
displays the change in 0.05 AU warning times for the diameter range 500-1000 m: 
 
Figure 10.  Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (500 < D< 1000m). 
As expected, warning times for known objects in this size range increased from one period to the next.  
The bulk of the objects in the first period (1984-1997, in blue) had negative warning times, prior to the 
congressional mandate.  Average warning times for these mid-sized objects increased in the next period, 
in blue, with 13 objects approaching within the 0.05 AU MOID between 0 and 2 years after initial 
detection. 
While the graph below gives the appearance of dramatic improvement, without 
incorporating missed approaches and uncertainties, it is just a building block. 
The size bin between 100 and 300 m has a more apparent increase in both 
number of objects discovered and in warning times for these objects.  Prior to the 
Spaceguard period, objects in this size range were not often detected.  From 1998-2011, 
detection rates in this size bin increased dramatically.  Warning times shifted to the 
right, but still measured only in days.  In other words, most of these objects were  
discovered either a few days before or after their close approach since 1998.  This 
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shows the effect that Spaceguard had. 
The chart for ~300-500 m objects follows.  Again, there is the expected increase 
in warning times for known objects.   
 
Figure 11.  Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~300 < D< 500m). 
This figure shows that from 1984-1997, over 20 approaches had negative warning 
times. In other words, the objects were detected over two years after their approaches.  
In 1998-2011, however, with increased technology, there dramatic improvement; most 
known approaches happened between 0 and 1 year after object discovery.  Also visible 
is a dramatic increase in discovery rates. 
 
Here is the histogram for 100-300 m close approaches: 
 
Figure 12.  Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~100 < D< 300 m). 
Most observed objects in this size range were discovered either a few days before or 
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after their 0.05 AU penetration.  Later we will see that many objects in this size range 
are also missed completely. 
Finally, here is the chart for objects from 25-100 m in diameter: 
 
Figure 13.  Known Object 0.05 AU Warning Times (~25 < D< 100 m). 
Object discoveries and approach warning times increased dramatically for very small 
objects.  From 1997-2011 (red), most approaches happened between 5 days before and 
10 days after discover.  Missed approaches, graphed later, will significantly change the 
distribution of warning times shown above. 
 
The above charts who how far in advance NASA was able to predict close 
approaches for discovered objects in the 14 years after 1998 as compared to the 14 
years prior to 1998. However, these graphs do not account for the PHAs that passed 
within 0.05 AU without being detected; these objects are referred to as “Missed 
objects” in this paper.  Nor do these graphs account for objects whose orbital 
uncertainties are very high.   In later sections, this is attempted.  First, detection rates, 




Detection Rates for New Objects 
 Counting detection rates over the last Spaceguard period and extrapolating these 
out over several more such periods will give us an estimate for future discoveries, 
based on current technology. Because there are upper limits to the number of objects in 
each size range, it is possible to estimate when most of the objects will be detected.  As 
more objects are detected, the likelihood of finding an undetected object goes down.  
Since the majority of large objects have been found, detection rates have declined.  
Detection rates for very small objects, however, have experienced marked increases, 
because the number of these objects is so vast that it will be decades to centuries before  
they are all detected.   
The following is a spreadsheet showing the detection rates counted from the 
same NEO-P dataset downloaded at the end of 2011 (NASA NEO- Program, 2011).  
Size bins again match those used by NEOWISE for consistency.  An important 
distinction here is that this table displays detection rates for PHAs, as opposed to close 
approaches.  One PHA can have several close approaches over the period 1900-2200. 











1998 4 13 9 21 8 4 12 
1999 4 5 9 14 14 2 16 
2000 7 15 16 28 27 2 29 
2001 3 20 16 30 41 7 48 
2002 9 24 22 39 51 12 63 
2003 2 11 16 30 48 22 70 
2004 5 14 12 40 99 33 132 
2005 6 11 19 43 100 51 151 
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2006 0 7 15 23 101 60 161 
2007 1 8 15 37 119 61 180 










2008 2 6 18 46 138 84 222 
2009 0 5 9 44 140 117 257 
2010 1 3 11 39 135 140 275 
2011 0 5 11 36 117 116 233 
Total 44 147 198 470 1138 711 1849 
Note: This table shows the number of PHAs detected each year for the combined 
Spaceguard effort from 1998-2011.  An upward trend for discovery of very small 
objects is visible.  This is likely due to technology increases. Also visible is a 
downward trend for large object discovery, as the population nears completion. Source 
data from NASAs Close Approach database. (NASA NEO-Program, 2011) 
 
Table 5.  Estimated PHAs Still Undetected. 
 
Note: This table lists the estimated total NEAs from the NEOWISE graphic and from the 
NASA NEO Science Definition Team graphic.  Below this, it lists the number of NEOs 
detected so far, and the percent completion of the population.  Following this is the number of 
PHAs counted in the database downloaded at the end of 2011.  These numbers change as more 
NEOs and PHAs are discovered, so a cut-off point for the study was the end of 2011.  Based on 
the total NEOs and percentage of NEOs discovered, we estimate the number of PHAs that will 
be in the database when it eventually reaches completion, for each size bin.  The final row is an 










1. Estimated Total NEAs 981* 1500* 2400* 15,700
* 
50,000- 1 M** 
2. NEAs Detected to date 912* 1200* 1100* 2000* 3000* 
3. % NEAs detected  as of  
    Dec  2011 
93% 80% 46% 13% .3%- 6% 
4.  PHAs counted in  
     database*** 
116 204 219 485 1166 
5. Total PHAs expected 125 255 478 3,807 19,433-389,000 
 
6.  PHAs left to detect++ 9 51 259 3,322 18,267-387,800 
*       from NEOWISE graphic 
**     from NASA NEO Science Definition Team graphic; significant uncertainty in this 
size range 
***   From the NEO-P dataset downloaded at the end of 2011. 
+       Divide row 4 by row 3.  
++     For completion (subtract row 4 from row 5) 
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estimate for the number of PHAs left to detect for each size bin.  The largest uncertainties will 
be found in the very small PHAs. 
For the large bodies (over 500 m), detection of the last objects appears to have 
leveled out.   
Discovery of objects over 1000 m is declining steadily as the population of 
objects left undiscovered decreases.  Any number of projections could be used to 
estimate how many future discoveries may take place.  A best fit curve yielded 1.88 
discoveries per year for objects over 1000 m and 3.66  per year for objects between 500 
and 1000 m, but almost any curve could be chosen. A range between 0 and 3 
discoveries per year for objects over 1000 m, and for objects from 500-1000 m, 
between 2 and 5 objects per year, appears to be fairly normal in recent years. 
Very small bodies (< 100m) are much more difficult to find and track.  They 
also have much larger populations and increasing detection rates.  For these bodies, we 
used a simple average of the detection rates from 2004, one of the early years of the 
Catalina Sky Survey, to 2011.  According to Dr. Timothy Spahr, head of the Minor 
Planet Center, detection of smaller objects has increased dramatically due to the 
Catalina Sky Survey (T. Spahr, personal communication, Feb 2, 2012).  Without 
reliable statistics on newer technologies, we use Catalina Sky Survey detection rates as 
our base.  When better technologies come on line, this study could be updated to reflect 
faster detection rates.  For PHAs 100-500m, we also used a simple average for the 
2004-2011 period.  Our resulting projected detection totals are shown in table 6. 
Table 6 does not take into account the high uncertainty in the orbits of small 
object, which are a complicating factor and are addressed in the next section. It appears 
that within two more 14-year periods, all objects greater than 300 m will have been 
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discovered and tracked; moreover, it appears that objects in the 100-300 m range might 
all be detected sometime in the 22nd century.  However, it may take longer than this 
because of the high uncertainty in many of the trajectories for objects under 300 m.  For 
objects under 100 m, even without including trajectory uncertainties, it will be 164 
years before a full catalog is possible, unless significant technological improvements 
take place.  And once trajectory uncertainties are incorporated, the time it takes for 
completion will grow considerably for smaller objects. 







500m 100-300m 25-100m 
PHAs left to detect  9 51 258.8 3322.2 19,433- 
389,000 
Average new objects 
per year (2004-2011) 
~1-3 
 
~2-5 ~14 ~39 ~120 
Yrs from now until all 
objects detected with 0  
loss rates* 
3-9 yrs 10-26 yrs ~19 yrs. ~86 yrs* ~164- 
over 
3,000* 
Detected 2012- 2025 9** 47** 192.5 539 1661 
*    Higher uncertainty rates for the small bodies would cause many of the very 
small bodies to be lost, increasing the time for completion. 
**  Calculated using best fit curve; all others are calculated using averages 
Note: The first row of this table (from the preceding table), and is an estimate of the 
number of PHAs left to detect in each size range.  The second row is an estimate for the 
average number of detections per year into the future, given no significant 
technological changes.  The third row estimates how many years it will take for 
completion, excluding loss rates.  The fourth row contains the estimated number of 
objects detected in the next Spaceguard period. 
 
Level 2 PHAs: High Orbital Uncertainties 
 We next estimated the number of Level 2 PHAs in our database- those PHAs 
whose orbital trajectories have such high uncertainties that they cannot be reliably 
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projected far enough into the future to provide substantive warning times.  The more 
Level 2 PHAs there are, the longer it will take for completion of the population. 
  Dr. Amy Mainzer, who runs NASA’s NEOWISE program at JPL, pointed out 
that although many NEAs are “discovered”, the astrometric uncertainties are often so 
large that an astronomer might have difficulty finding the object. (A. Mainzer, personal 
communication, October 6, 2011).  For small objects, there are several barriers that 
prevent high certainty trajectory predictions.  One of these is the great difficulty finding 
and observing for extended arc lengths over more than one opposition, bodies that are 
faint.  Small objects, “typically have much weaker orbits that only allow prediction 
intervals of a few decades or less” (S. Chesley, personal communication, January 29, 
2012).   
 Moreover, according to Dr. Paul Chodas, the source of these uncertainties is in 
the radial distance of the object from the Earth for NEAs with short observations arcs 
(only observed for a short period of time).  A radial distance of a few thousand km will 
“map into an uncertainty in the heliocentric semi-major axis, which over time maps into 
a large uncertainty along the orbit path of the object.  When this uncertainty becomes 
too large, we can’t be certain that a predicted close approach will occur at all, since the 
object could be anywhere within a large region” (P. Chodas, personal communication, 
January 30, 2012).  As an example of such uncertainty, McMillan notes that “ PHA 
2003 BK47 was discovered by Spacewatch at V = 21.8 and pounded (sic) with 50 
observations spanning more than a month, yet the uncertainty of its ephemeris at its 
next favorable apparition in 2011 will be 2-3 degrees” (McMillan, 2009, p. p. 3).  If the 
uncertainty is too high, over time, the object can be effectively lost. 
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 Additionally, non-gravitational forces affect small bodies over centuries in ways 
which are not all very well modeled.  According to Lindley Johnson and the NASA JPL 
website, JPL considers the eight major planets, Earth and Moon separately, Ceres, 
Vesta, and Pallas when calculating orbits of NEAs, just as the Minor Planet Center 
website does (NASA JPL, 2011).  All major gravitational perturbations, therefore, are 
accounted for, and except for very small objects, the orbits of PHAs are predictable if 
enough observations are made.    
 For very small objects, however, could non-gravitational forces have enough 
effect on PHAs to require their re-detection years later?  Could such non-gravitational 
forces delay completion of the population by modifying the orbits of small objects such 
that they are eventually lost?  According to Dr. Steven Chesley, NASA JPL, the 
Yarkovsky affect increases as the inverse of the asteroid diameter and causes orbital 
trajectory deviations on the order of 10-20 km in 500m objects over the course of a 
decade.  (S. Chesley, personal communication, Nov 14, 2011).   Allouis et al. (2007) 
state that, “The Yarkowski (sic) Effect alone can shift the position of Apophis by over 
100 km between 2017 and 2029, which means it cannot be ignored in the orbit 
propagation models (EADS Astrium, 2007, p. iv).  Apophis has a diameter of 
approximately 270 m.  Over the course of 5,000 years, an object in the Apophis size 
range could, therefore, have its trajectory modified by over 50,000 km, or four Earth 
diameters.  For objects under 100 m range, such 50,000 km orbital deviations could 
take place in a few hundred years, prior to completion of the survey of these very small 
objects.   
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 Over the course of the time it would take to discover all objects under 100 m in 
diameter, therefore, non-gravitational effects might necessitate their rediscovery, if the 
Spaceguard program does not have consistent funding and continued application over 
the course of several decades to centuries. 
To approximate the percentage of high uncertainty objects (Level 2 PHAs), a 
compilation of the number of close approaches in each Spaceguard period over the 
course of 300 years (from 1900-2200) was completed.   










1914- 1927   17   35   34    59 57    21 
1928- 1941   12   40   39    77     68    30 
1942- 1955   17   35   46    72     92    45 
1956- 1969   22   29   39    66     87    57 
1970- 1983   10   34   32    76     71    64 
1984- 1997   19   41   33    69     92    60 
1998- 2011   19   37   75  328 1166  804 
2012- 2025   15   32   49    96     68    48 
2026- 2039     9   37   42    68     90    46 
2040- 2053   12   41   41    79     90    70 
2054- 2067   17   33   36    78     90    59 
2068- 2081   21   36   36    78     79    38 
2082- 2095   18   27   43    58     77    29 
2096- 2109   14   42   44     81     53    20 
2110- 2123   19   29   35     63     42    17 
2124- 2137   19   40   39     62     39    19 
2138- 2151   12   32   40     59     39    13 
2152- 2165     6   34   38     53     34      7 
2166- 2179   11   36   43     43     33      7 
2180- 2193   14   23   28     42     23      6 
2194- 2200 (only 6 yrs.)   12   17   18     18     18      4 
Total (20.428spacegaurd periods) 315 710 830 1625 2408 1464 
Average per period   15.42   34.76   40.63    79.55 117.88    71.67 
Standard Deviation     4.33     5.04     9.54    59.75 247  173 
Note: Note that for bodies larger than 500 m, the approaches in all periods are close to the mean.  
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However, for bodies smaller than 500 m, there are a significantly greater number of approaches in the 
1998-2011 period than in the periods after and before it.  This means that many of the small objects 
discovered between 1998 and 2011 had uncertainties too high to forward and backward project their 
close approaches for more than a few years.  If the uncertainties were lower, one would see a fairly 
constant rate of close approaches, as is the case for the larger bodies.   
 
Figure 14.  00.05 AU Close Approach Trends 1900-2200.  
Note that for large bodies (blue), the number of approaches is fairly.  Bodies under 500 
m, seemingly have a higher number of close approaches in the 1998-2011 period.  This 
peak gives us an estimate for the percent of approaching bodies with high trajectory 
uncertainty.  If all objects were detected had well-known orbits, the peaks would be the 
norm. 
Level 1 PHAs discovered from 1998-2011 should have highly refined orbital 
trajectories, which have been projected forward to 2200 and back to 1900.  If all PHAs 
have Level 1 trajectories (high certainty), the number of approaches should be 
consistent throughout 1900-2200.  This is the case for large bodies, which have high 
trajectory certainties, because JPL can project all approaches back to 1900 and forward 
to 2200.  However, small bodies, with high uncertainties, show a significant increase in 
close approaches between 1998-2012, with a sharp decline in the following periods.  
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This is because, due to uncertainty, the approaches for these small objects could only be 
projected a few years out. By measuring the percentage decline from the peak, we can 
get an idea for the percentage of objects with trajectory uncertainties too high to map 
out to future periods.  This provides us the percent of Level 2 PHAs in the observed 
population.   
Approaches in the  >1000 m bin and 500-1000 m bin have no significant peak.  
All values for those size bins are within 2.1 standard deviations from the mean.  
However the peaks for the 300-500 m and 100-300 m bins are larger than three 
standard deviations from the mean.  The peak for the 25-100 m size bin, not depicted 
above, is 1166, similarly over 3 standard deviations from the mean.    
The next table displays the method used for and results of calculating the percent of 
objects with Level 2 trajectories- that is, trajectories which cannot be projected out 
more than another Spaceguard period, or 14 years.  Level 1 trajectories can are well 
defined  between 1900-2200 and beyond.  The first rows of table 8 originate from the 
preceding table (as displayed in figure 17): 
Table 8.  Estimated Percentage of Level 2 PHAs (high uncertainty) for 0.05 AU 
Penetrations. 
Estimated Diameter Range 301- 500m 100- 300m 25- 100m <25m 
H Value 20.3-19.3 22.7-20.4 25.7-22.8 >25.7 
1. Average approaches per 14 yr period 40.6 79.5 117.9 71.7 
2. Average w/o peak 38.9 66.8 63.9 34.0 
3. Peak 75 328 1166 804 
4. Level 2 PHAs in Spaceguard period. 36.1 261.2 1102 770 
5. Estimated Percent Level 2 PHAs in  
     period  
48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 95.8% 
Note: This table estimates the number of PHAs in a period that are not observed long enough to 
have Level 1 (highly certain) trajectories.  The first row gives the estimated H value for that 
size range.  Item “1”, is the average of all of the approaches in the preceding table.  “2” is the 
average when the peak from the 1998-2011 time period is deleted.  Item 3 is the peak value.  
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Item 4 subtracts the average “2” from the peak value “3”.  Item 5 comes from dividing item 4 
from item 3; this is the percent PHAs with high uncertainties.  In our model, these are 
essentially “lost” for warning time purposes because they do not have reliable orbital 
projections.   
 Another method by which average uncertainty rates could be calculated might 
be to perform a count within the Minor Planet Center or JPL Small Body Database 
Browser of how many objects in various size bins have been observed at more than 1 
opposition or for some minimum arc length for high certainty.  Using another method 
might provide another means to calculate the loss rates for veracity.  In any case, the 
rates in the last row for Level 2 PHAs will be incorporated into our model later on, after 
another part that cannot be left out is addressed- missed approaches. 
Estimating Missed Approaches 
Our next step was to model a simple estimate of missed approaches to add to 
our overall model.  Missed objects, and their corresponding missed approaches, are 
important because they are objects that have flown into and out of the 0.05 AU MOID 
without detection.  The objects might have been simply missed due to lack of coverage 
or technology to see all very small objects, or they might be undetectable because the 
objects might, for example, “spend all their time interior to the Earth’s orbit and are 
therefore detectable only at solar elongations of less than 90°” (Grav, 2011, p. 425).   In 
our model, missed approaches are added in, with warning times of 0.   
An iterative process captured in the next 5 tables and described below was used 
to calculate the number of missed approaches out to the Spaceguard period ending in 
2067.  The number of known approaches was subtracted from the total estimated 
approaches over the 300 year period (1900-2200) for each size bin and then dividing 
this by the number of periods to determine the average # of missed approaches per 
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period.  This simplistic approach may provide some estimates.  Monte Carlo Simulation 
could be used for an in depth project to estimate missed approaches. 
Equation 2 
𝐴𝑚 =  𝐴𝑇 −  𝐴𝐾 
Where Am is the estimated number of missed approaches from 1900-2200, AT is the 
estimated total number of approaches from 1900-2200, and AK is the number of known 
approaches from 1900-2200. Known approaches do not constitute all approaches.  
Objects which have not yet been detected may penetrate the .05 AU MOID.  These 
“missed approaches” are the total approaches minus the known approaches.  The error 
in this estimate will be comparable to the error in the total estimated approaches.  
Next this is divided by the number of 14 year periods within our data period of 1900-
2200, which is 20.4, to determine the average # of missed approaches per period. 
Equation 3 




Where Am����𝑆𝑆  is the average number of missed approaches per Spaceguard period and 
20.43 is the number of Spaceguard periods within the 1900-2200 time period. 
In order to find this, AT must first be estimated.  AK, the number of known approaches 
from 1900-2200, comes from our database pull from the NEO-P website (NASA NEO- 
Program, 2011).  To calculate AT (the total estimated approaches), the number of 
known approaches was divided by the percentage objects that have been detected to 








Where Pd is the percentage of objects detected.  Equation 4 is based on the following 
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logic:  If we know the percentage of 500-1000 m diameter objects that have been 
discovered (Pd =80%), and the number of approaches corresponding to these known 
objects (AK = 710), the remaining 20% of undiscovered objects add a proportional 
number of approaches.  Therefore by dividing the known approaches by the percent of 
objects discovered, an estimate for the total approaches is made at AT = 710/.8= 888 
approaches.  The missed approaches Am are then the total (888) minus the known 
(710), or 178 missed penetrations of the MOID.  This method has error proportional to 
the error in the percentage of undiscovered objects.  More confidence in the results 
could come if some form of Monte Carlo simulations could yield better estimates for 
the total numbers of PHA approaches. 
Compiling the Data 
These simple equations and additional ones discussed after the next table, which 
contains an iterative process beginning with the compilation from the previous 
population tables for the following spreadsheet.  The goal of this process is to project 
future detection rates, missed approaches, and level 2 PHAs (high uncertainty).  Table 
10 contains the initial steps of this process.  
 Using equation 2, the number of missed approaches is the total number of 
approaches minus the number of known approaches, or 710 for 500-1000 m PHAs.  
This gives us the missed approaches for 1900-2200, or 178.  These are divided by 20.4, 
the number of Spaceguard periods in 300 years, to get an expected number of missed 
approaches of 8.69 per period.  So in each 14 year period a 500-1000 m object may 
penetrate the 0.05 AU MOID 9 times without our knowing about it.  These missed 





Table 9.  Estimated Missed 0.05 AU MOID Approaches 1998-2011. 
1998-2011 >1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m 25-100m 
Given      
a. Total estimated PHAs 
      
125 255 478 3807 19,433-
389,000 
b. Total PHAs by 2011  
     (table 5) 
116 204 219 485 1,166 
c. PHA detections  (table 4) 44 147 198 470 1138 
d. % objects detected by 2011 
    (table 5) 
   93%      80%     46%      13% .3%- 6% 
e.  Known Approaches  
     1900-2200 (table 7) 
315 710 830 1625 2,408 
f.  % Level 2 PHAs- highly  
     uncertain trajectories 
     (table 8) 
0 0 48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 
Calculate:      
1. Total approaches 
     1900-2200 (equation 5) 
339 888 1,811 12,756 ~40,000-
>750,000 
2. Missed approaches 
    1900-2200 (equation 2) 
~24 ~178 ~981 ~11,131 ~38,000-
>748,000 
3. Missed approaches per 
    period (equation 3) 
~1 ~9 ~48 ~545 ~2,000-
37,000 
4.  Expected # Level 2 PHAs  
      this period 
      (= row c* row f) 
0 0 ~95 ~374 ~1,076 
Note: This table contains 5 rows of data from previous parts of our discussion.  These data are 
first used to calculate the total estimated approaches by dividing the known approaches (e) by 
the % of objects detected (c).  Missed approaches are derived by subtracting the known 
approaches (e) from the total (1).  The expected missed approaches per period is equal to the 
total missed approaches (1900-2200) divided the # of Spaceguard periods, or 20.4.  Finally, the 
expected number of PHAs with high uncertainty (Level 2), is calculated by multiplying the 
percent of level 2 PHAs by the discovered PHAs in the period.  
 
 The next table reflects the first to attempt to project the number of PHA 
detections, approaches, missed approaches, level 1 PHAs (high certainty trajectories), 
level 2 PHAs (highly uncertain trajectories) into the next Spaceguard period, which 
ends in 2025.  Coincidentally, this is also the year that President Obama has declared as 
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the year by which we should send a human to an asteroid.  
 
Tables 10 through 13 result in several values that are used in the graphs in the 
following section.  This includes the missed approaches, new known approaches, and 
level 2 PHAs.   The following is a breakdown of how each of these elements was 
calculated. 
Table 10. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 2012-
2025. 
2012-2025 Projection >1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m 25-100m 
Given:      
a. Total estimated PHAs 
    (table 5) 
125 255 478 3807 19,433-
389,000 
b. Total estimated Approaches 
    1900-2200 (table 9 #1) 
339 888 1,811 12,756 ~40,000-
>750,000 
c. Projected PHA detections 
    2012-2025 (table 6) 
8 47 193 539 1,661 
d. Expected # Level 2 PHAs,  
    previous period (table 9) 
0 0 95.41 374.34 1075.61 
e.  % Level 2 PHAs (table 8) 0 0 48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 
f. PHAs detected by 2011 
    (table 9) 
116 204 219 485 1,166 
Calculate:       
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2025                     
     = row f –row d + row c 
124 251 316 650 1,751 
1b. Approaches to Object ratio 
       = row b / row a 
2.72 3.48 3.79 3.35 2.07 
1c. Approaches per period for 
      new PHA detections 
       = row c * row 1b /20.4 
1 8 36 89 168 
2. % PHAs detected to Level 1 
     by 2025 =  row1 / row a 
99.4% 98% 66% 17% 9% 
3. Missed approaches 
     1900-2200 
     =(100%- row 2)* row b 
2 14 613 10,580 36,000-
748,000 
4. Missed approaches this  
     period  = row3/20.4 
.1 .68 30 518 1,788 
5. Level 2 PHAs this period* 
     = row c * row e 
0 0 95.41 374.34 1,075.61 
* For example, for 301-500 m bin, of 193 projected detections, 48% have highly uncertain 
trajectories = 95.41 lost objects for that period.  See section referencing loss rates for an explanation 
of that rate. 
Note: By 2025, almost all PHAs over 500 m will be found.  66% of PHAs over 300 m will be found, but 
for smaller objects, from 100-300 m and 25-100 m, only a small percentage will have been found.  The 
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discussion following describes each calculation in the table. 
 
 
 1.  Total Level 1 PHAs by 2025.  This is the total number of PHAs with high 
certainties to their trajectories that we expect will be discovered by 2025.  This is equal 
to the PHAs detected by the end of the previous period (2011) plus the new PHAs 
detected in the current period (2012-2025) minus the level 2 PHAs from the previous 
period (whose orbital uncertainty only allows up to 1 period of projection forward) or: 
Equation 5 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐿1𝑓 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐿1𝑖 + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝑑 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐿2𝑓 
Where PHAL1f is the number of level 1 PHAs known by the end of the period, PHAL1iis 
the number of level 1 PHAs known at the beginning of the period, PHAd is the number 
of PHAs detected in the period, and PHAL2f is the number of level 2 PHAs known by 
the beginning of the period. 
 
 1b. Approaches to Object Ratio.  Every object penetrates the .05 AU MOID 
several times over the course of 300 years.  The ratio of the number of penetrations to 











is the ratio of approaches to PHAs, and PHAT is the total estimated 
number of known PHAs. 
1c. Approaches per period for newly discovered PHAs.   For each new object 
discovered, there are several new known .05 AU penetrations spread out over 1900-






   
𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝑑 × 𝑅𝐴 𝑃𝐻𝐴� ÷ 20.43 
  
Where ASGn is the number of approaches per Spaceguard period for newly 
detected PHAs. 
2.  Percentage Level 1 PHAs detected by period end.  This is the percentage of 
PHAs detected by the end of the period with enough orbital certainty to project their 
trajectories for the whole period 1900-2200.  It is given by dividing the total level 1 







3.  Missed approaches 1900-2200.  As previously mentioned, the number of 
missed approaches changes with each new period; every time a new PHA is discovered 
and its orbit projected, its approaches become known.  Approaches missed from the 
database are determined by multiplying the percentage undetected PHAs by the total 
estimated approaches calculated in equation 5.  So the number of missed approaches in 
each new period will change as more objects are discovered. 
Equation 9 




 4.  Missed approaches this period.  This approximately equals the updated total 
missed approaches divided by the number of 14 year periods and is represented by the 
variable Am����𝑆𝑆 ,𝑓.  The number of missed approaches in a particular period is unknown; 
only the average across all periods can be used. 
Equation 10  





 5.  Level 2 PHAs this period.  This is the number of PHAs discovered whose 
orbital trajectories cannot be predicted out past 14 years.  This is calculated by 
multiplying the projected PHA detections in this period by the estimated percentage of 
level 2 PHAs calculated earlier (in table 8).  The percentage of level 2 (high 
uncertainty) PHAs should remain fairly constant until new observing technology and/or 
improved observing methods are introduced.  Projections in this paper are based only 
on current observing technology and techniques.  The equation for Level 2 PHAs is: 
Equation 11 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐿2𝑓 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝑑  × %𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐿2𝑓  
 
Where PHAL2f  is the number of number of level 2 PHAs known by the end of 
the period, PHAd is the number of PHAs detected in the period, and %PHAL2f is the 
estimated percentage of PHAs detected in the period with low certainty orbits.   
The following three tables show the results of iterating these equations over the 






Table 11. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 2026-
2039. 
 
2026-2039 Projection >1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m 25-100m 
Given:      
a.  Total estimated PHAs 125 255 478 3807 19,433-
389,000 
b.  Total estimated  
     Approaches  
     1900-2200  
     (table 9 #1) 
339 888 1,811 12,756 40,000- 
750,000 
c. Projected PHA  
    detections this period 
     (table 5) 
0 4 193 539 1,661 
d. Expected # Level 2  
    PHAs, previous period 
    (table 10) 
0 0 95.41 374.34 1,075.61 
e. % Level 2 PHAs  
    (table 8) 
0 0 48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 
f. PHAs detected by   
   2025 (table 10) 
116 204 219 485 1,166 
Calculate:      
1.  Level 1 PHAs by 2039 
     = row f – row d + row c 
124 255 416 759 1842 
1b. Approaches to Object 
      ratio 
2.72 3.48 3.79 3.35 2.07 
1c. Approaches per 
      period for new PHA  
      detections  
      = row c * row1b/20.4 
0 1 36 89 168 
2. % PHAs detected to  
     Level 1 by 2039 
      = row 1 /row a 
99.4% 99% 87% 20% 9% 
3. Missed approaches 
    1900-2200  
    = (100%- row 2) *  
     row b 
2 9 235 10,212 36,000-
750000 
4. Missed approaches  
    this period 
    (=row 3/20.4) 
.1 .43 12 500 1,779 
5. Level 2 PHAs this 
    Period = row c * row e 
0 0 93 429 1,570 
Note: As seen from comparing item 1 to item a, by 2039, virtually all objects over 500 m have been 
found and objects from 300-500 m are nearing completion.  But objects from 100- 300 m still have 
decades before completion.  With this level of completion, large objects will still have on average two 
undetected penetrations of the MOID (item 3) in the three hundred year period, with approximately .1 
missed approaches (item 4) in the period.  Small objects will be missed frequently, with 500 missed 
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penetrations (item 4) of 100-300 m objects through the MOID in the period.  Within the same size range, 
about 429 PHAs (item 5) will have very high uncertainties to their trajectories, so they will not provide 
reliable orbital projections. 
 
Table 12.  Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 2040-
2053 
2040-2053 Projection >1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m 25-100m 
Given:      
a.  Total estimated PHAs 125 255 478 3807 19,433-
389,000 
b.  Total estimated  
     Approaches  1900-2200 
(table 9 #1) 
339 888 1,811 12,756 40,000- 
750,000 
c. Projected PHA 
detections this period 
(table 5) 
0 0 62 539 1,661 
d. Expected # Level 2 
      PHAs, previous period 
(table 10) 
0 0 93 429 1,570 
e. % Level 2 PHAs (table 
8) 
0 0 48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 
f. PHAs detected by 2039 
(table 11) 
124 255 416 759 1842 
Calculate:      
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2053 
    = row f – row d +row c 
124 255 478 869 1933 
1b. Approaches to Object  
       ratio 
2.72 3.48 3.79 3.35 2.07 
1c. Approaches per period 
for new PHA detections 
= row c * row 1b/20.4 
0 0 12 89 168 
2. % PHAs detected to 
Level 1 by 2053 
     = row 1 / row a 
99.4% 99% 99% 23% 10% 
3. Missed approaches 
1900-2200  
     = (100%- row 2)* row b 
2 9 18 9,844 36,000-
750,000 
4. Missed approaches this 
period (= row 3/20.4) 
.1 .43 .89 482 1,769 
5. Level 2 PHAs this 
period =  row c *row  e 
0 0 30 429 1,570 
Note: Table 12 shows that by 2053, virtually all of the objects over 300 m have been found 
(item 2), but objects from 100- 300 m still have decades before completion.  Objects 25- 100 m 
may have several hundred years  until completion, because even after 55 year, only 10 % will 






Table 13. Projected Missed Approaches, New Approaches, and Level 2 PHAs 2054-
2067. 
2054-2067 Projection >1km 500m-1km 301-500m 100-300m 25-100m 
Given:      
a.  Total estimated PHAs 125 255 478 3807 19,433-
389,000 
b.  Total estimated 
Approaches  1900-
2200 (table 9 #1) 
339 888 1,811 12,756 40,000-
750,000 
c. Projected PHA 
detections this period 
(table 5) 
0 0 30 539 1,661 
d. Expected # Level 2 
PHAs, previous period 
(table 12) 
0 0 30 429 1,570 
e. % Level 2 PHAs (table 
8) 
Unkn. Unkn. 48.2% 79.7% 94.5% 
f. PHAs detected by 2053 
(table 12) 
124 255 478 869 1933 
Calculate:      
1. Level 1 PHAs by 2067   
= row f –  
     row d + row c 
124 255 478 979 2024 
1b. Approaches to   
      Object ratio 
2.72 3.48 3.79 3.35 2.07 
1c. Approaches per 
period for new PHA 
detections = row c * 
row 1b/20.4 
0 0 0 89 168 
2. % PHAs detected to 
Level 1 by 2067 
     = row 1 / row a 
99.4% 99% 99% 26% 10% 
3. Missed approaches 
1900-2200  
     = (100%- row2)*  row  
b 
2 9 18 9,477 35,900- 
749,000 
4. Missed approaches this 
period (= row 3/20.4) 
.1 .43 .89 463 1,760 
5. Level 2 PHAs this 
period 
     = row c * row e 
0 0 14 429 1,570 
Note: This table shows the final period projected.  By 2067, virtually all of the objects over 300 
m have been found by the end of this time period, but objects from 100- 300 m still have 
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decades before completion.  Objects 25- 100 m, because of uncertainty levels, have advanced 
less than 1% in completion, with 1,760 approaches passing by undetected every 14 years.     
  
 
Future Close Approach Warning Times 
The next step was to combine the data from the preceding table with the graphs 
in the section “detection-to-approach times for known objects” to develop a picture of 
when warning times into the 0.05 AU MOID will be long enough on average to provide 
time for a pre-cursor transponder mission if necessary.  The amount of time needed to 
act on an object is debatable, but for the purposes of this study 25-60 years was used, 
falling loosely in line with previously cited NASA Administrator Mike Griffin’s 
testimony.  As with the known object close approaches the next part of the process 
begins again at the >1000 m size bin, this time adding in estimates for missed 
detections and lost objects as calculated in the last tables.  In the histograms that follow, 
all values from the previous histograms showing known object warning times are 
present, except that all negative warning times are grouped as “≤0”.  Negative warning 
times (and 0 warning times) for a 0.05 MOID penetration represent a failure of our 
detection systems, no matter how small or large the negative value is.  Missed approach 
warning times, in these graphs, are also grouped in the ≤0 bin, because if an object 
penetrates the 0.05 AU MOID without any detection, our detection systems have failed 
to provide warning.  Projected detections are added in as a uniform distribution over the 
14 year period of detection.  Other possibilities would include using a normal 
distribution, or a random distribution.  Evidence of the 7300 events shows a fairly 
uniform distribution of approaches, as previously shown in figure 17, when 
observational bias due to small object uncertainties is removed.  Chapter III, Results, 
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contains the charts that attempts to combine all of this information. 
 
Potential Improvements to the Method 
The methodology developed here is not meant to be a definitive answer with no 
error associated to it.  Rather, the method is something that over time could be 
developed into a mechanism by which more accurate warning times could be derived.  
A few additions and improvements to the method would be desirable, either as a post 
graduate project, or as a development within the NEO community. The following 
paragraphs discuss such possible improvements.  
Better refinement of the estimates of total PHAs would greatly improve the 
model.  In this study, PHAs came from estimates for total NEAs and the percentage of 
NEAs so far discovered. 
A more refined technique for estimating the total number of missed PHAs and 
missed approaches is another possible improvement. This could involve Monte Carlo 
simulations using a synthetic NEA population. Another method might compare past 
technology non-detections to current technology detections. 
Another improvement would be improved statistical research on the distribution 
of warning times for future discoveries.  Are warning times distributed over a uniform, 
normal, or Poisson distribution? 
Improved methods for determine the percentage of objects that are lost or that 
have high uncertainty trajectory rates could improve the model. This could involve 
using the JPL database to determine the number of objects that have been viewed on 
more than one opposition.  
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A thorough study of the distribution of PHA and NEA orbits as related to 
discovery rates would be an improvement. Are current observation techniques missed a  
particular subset of NEAs, such as those with high inclinations, or those which have 
periods that might keep them hidden by the sun?  
Another consideration is the usage of a disk rather than a MOID. NEAs with 
high inclinations may potentially have less chance of striking the Earth than those 
whose orbits are close to the ecliptic (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 18 April 
2012). 
Smaller size bins could be examined. It is becoming apparent that the next 
actionable EI will be in the less than 500 m size range, and most likely under 300 m.  
However, a refined study could potentially estimate this on a continuous graph rather 
than by large size bins.  Is the most likely size 100 or 200 m? 
Sensitivity checks could be carried out to see what the answer is should variations 
in the inputs be within some range.  For example, the average albedo of PHAs used in 
this model is .14 based on the most current estimates.  A sensitivity check could be 
carried out to determine the effects on the results if this average albedo were changed 
by one or two standard deviations in either direction. 









Beginning with the largest size objects, the following histograms represent the 
predictions for future warning times for approaches within 0.05 AU of the earth that 
this nascent model provides.  The data displayed is divided into three categories.  One 
color depicts close approach warning times of known objects from the NEO-P 
database, as previously displayed in the warning charts earlier in this thesis.  Another 
color depicts the estimated missed approaches previously discussed.   Again, missed 
approaches are given a warning time value of 0.  Another color depicts estimated close 
approaches of newly discovered objects. 
PHAs > 1000 m 
 The following three histograms display warning times for penetrations of the 
0.05 AU MOID counts for PHAs greater than 1000 m or H<17.75, during the years 
1998-2011 and two subsequent periods.  These graphs contain a fairly obvious set of 
conclusions, namely that Spaceguard has been a success for this size range.  During the 
first period, most PHAs in this size range passed through the MOID with less than 21 
years of warning, although a few approaches were anticipated by over 60 years.  One 
approach, in red, is the estimated number of missed approaches during that time period.  
In other words, there was likely one undiscovered PHA over 1000 m that passed within 
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the 0.05 AU MOID during that time period, as shown in table 10.  In the later period, 
most penetrations of the MOID happen with between 6 and 48 years of warning, with a 
very small chance of a single missed approach.  Between 2026 and 2039, all 




Figure 15.  Close Approach Warning Times 1997-2011, D> 1 km. 
This figure shows that for most penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID, there between 0 and 
21 years warning time.  For example, 2 PHAs were detected 12 years before their close 
approaches.  As estimated in table 10, there is 1 approach (shown in red) by an 




Figure 16.  Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025, D> 1 km. 
In the next 14 years, every penetration of the MOID will have been anticipated by over 
6 years, with 43% of approaches known for over 30 years.  There is still a slight chance 
of a missed approach (0 warning time) in this time period. 
 
 
Figure 17.  Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039, D> 1 km. 
In the period from 2026-2039, 78% of approaches by large objects will have over 30 
years warning time, and 99% will have over 24 years.  There is still a very slight 
chance of a missed approach as shown in table 12.  These results were fairly obvious 
given the known success of Spaceguard with this size range. 
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The following graph sums up the anticipated progression of early warning for 
large object penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID from 1984 through 2039.  From the end 
of the Spaceguard’s first 14 years, up through the present, these 0.05 penetration 
warning times move up significantly.  The mean is 27.4 years for projected 2012-2025 
approaches, incorporating the single missed approach.  This climbs to a mean of 38.07 
for 2026-2039 approaches, well beyond the previously mentioned 30 years in Mike 
Griffin’s testimony, which, though somewhat arbitrary, is a reasonable estimate for 
carrying out the full target-cycle, which will include first additional ground 
observations, then a precursor mission to determine the necessity of the deflection 
mission, and then the deflection mission. 
 
Figure 18.  3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D> 1 km. 
This graph displays a fairly obvious high success rate for Spaceguard with large 
objects.  The right side of this chart shows the periods studied, beginning at the back 




Figure 18 displays an obvious result for large objects, Spaceguard has been a 
success.  All PHAs in this size range will be discovered and tracked with enough 
certainty to provide an average of 27 years notice of their next penetrations into the 
MOID within the 2012-2025 period.  Following this period, warning times for 
penetrations will continue to increase.  
 
Figure 19.  Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011 D= 500-1000m. 
Depicted are the 8.69 missed approaches (in red), along with the majority of known 
approaches with under 3 years warning time. 
 
PHAs ~500- 1000 m 
 
 Spaceguard has had and will have almost as good success for PHAs in the 500-
1000 m size range.  The following graphs show that during the first period, most PHAs 
in this size range passed through the MOID with less than 6 years of warning.  There 
were approximately 9 missed approaches (in red) of undiscovered PHA in this size 
range, as shown in table 9.  In the following period, most penetrations of the MOID 
happen with between 6 and 42 years warning. However,  as table 10 shows, there are 
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projected to be eight approaches by newly discovered PHAs in this size range within 
the next 14 years, as well as 0.68 missed approaches by PHAs not yet discovered.  
Also, most warning times for MOID penetration will be above 21 years.  PHAs 
discovered during the 2012-2025 time period will have some corresponding approaches 
in the 2025-2039 period.  These estimated approaches of newly discovered objects are 
in green.  Between 2026 and 2039, 89% of penetrations of the 0.05 AU MOID will 
have early warning of over 15 years, with no missed approaches.  In the following 
period, 92% of penetrations will have over 30 years warning time. 
 
 
Figure 20. Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025 D= 500-1000m. 
Here we see a small chance of having a missed approach (in red).  Additionally, an 
estimated 8 penetrations will occur during this time period of PHAs discovered after 
2011 (see table 11, row 1c.).  These are given warning times of less than or equal to 
zero due to lack of information, although it is more likely that some spread around zero 




Figure 21. Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 500-1000m. 
About 52% of 0.05 AU penetrations after 2026 will have over 30 years warning time, 
when accounting for missed approaches and approaches of objects discovered after 
2011. Projected discoveries after 2012 are given a uniform distribution (in green). 
 
 
Figure 22.  Close Approach Warning Times 2040-2053 D= 500-1000m. 
Including all missed approaches, approaches of objects discovered after 2011, and 
approaches of all currently known (prior to 2011) objects, 92% will provide over 30 
years warning time for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID. 
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By 2011 80% of 500-1000 m objects have been detected.  Warning times for 
penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID are projected to move up to a mean of 20.9 in the 
next 14 years.  Mean penetration warning time grows to 33.5 years for 2026-2039 
approaches, because by this time, most objects will have been discovered, with only a 
slight chance of a missed approach.  By the period 2054-2067, all approaches will be 
anticipated by over 30 years, and 61% of approaches will have over 60 years of 
warning time.  This gives enough time to go through all necessary decision points in a 
layered planetary defense.   
 
Figure 23.  3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 500-1000. 
Warning times for penetration are already moving up quickly for this size bin.  By 2026, 





PHAs ~300- 500 m 
 
Spaceguard has some success for PHAs in the 300-500 m size range, but 
progress in the next two periods will be critical in establishing completeness within this 
size range.  The following graphs show that during the first period, most PHAs in this 
size range passed through the MOID with less than 1 year of warning.  Table 9 displays 
48 missed approaches (in red) of undiscovered PHA in this size range.  The following 
period shows little progress, because of an anticipated 30 missed approaches and 36 
approaches of newly detected objects.   Between 2026 and 2039, only 29% of 
penetrations within the MOID will likely have early warning of over 24 years, due to 
the anticipated number of missed approaches and new discoveries still occuring in that 
period.  A factor that causes a delay of completion in this size group is the higher 
uncertainties in the trajectories.  In the following period, 33% of penetrations will have 
over 24 years warning time, and 63% will have over 10 years warning time.  
 
Figure 24.  Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011, D= 300-500 m. 
A high number of approaches in this size bin, estimated at 48, have been missed since 
the 1998 congressional mandate, which applied only to larger objects.  84% of 




Figure 25.  Close Approach Warning Times 2012-2025 D= 300-500 m. 
Approaches of newly discovered PHAs and missed approaches will bring the average 
penetration warning times down close to 0 in this period.  
 
 
Figure 26.  Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 300-500 m. 
As newly objects projected for discovery after 2012 provide longer warning times in 
this period, the picture improves a little.  About 30% of penetrations should have 




Figure 27.  Close Approach Warning Times 2040-2053 D= 300-500 m. 
Here, the missed approach rate declines, as the population of 300-500 m objects 
reaches completion.  Newly discovered objects also decline as the population reaches 
completion.  By the next period there will be virtually no missed approaches or newly 
discovered objects.   
The following summary chart shows that early warning times for penetration 
will go from near 0 to over 24 years for 33% of PHAs in this size range by the end of 
2053.  By 2067, after completion, warning times will reach the required 30 years for 
most objects.    
 
Figure 28.  3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 300-500. 
In the first period, penetration warning times were below 0, and moved to below 1 in 
the period since the 1998 congressional mandate.  In the next period (2012-2025) 38% 
of penetrations will provide over 10 years warning time.  63% of penetrations from 




The delay in having reliable warning times comes from the high uncertainties in 
trajectories of 48.5% of PHAs (see table 8) in this size range.  This uncertainty, 
accompanied by the high number of PHAs in this size range, has the potential to delay 
completion for several decades.  If the uncertainty level can be reduced through greater 
funding, the length of time until completion can be cut significantly, giving more 
warning time for penetration of this early layer for planetary defense.  The reduction of 
uncertainties may require re-observation, re-discovery, and observation over long arc 
lengths for new discoveries.  Uncertainty in the orbital trajectory plays an even greater 
role in the 100-300 m bin, which is addressed next.  
PHAs ~100- 300 m 
 PHAs in this size bin are more numerous than all of the PHAs larger than 300 m 
combined.  Table 5 shows the estimate of total PHAs in this size range at 3,807, 
whereas there are only an estimated 478 PHAs in the 300-500 m range.  Because 
progress is much slower in this size bin, only every other period is shown in the graphs 
below.  In the first period, over 500 missed penetrations of 0.05 AU occur.  In the 
2026-2039 period, there are still 500 projected missed penetrations and 168 approaches 
by newly discovered PHAs.  Even as late as 2054-2067, there are 463 missed 
penetrations and still some 168 approaches by newly discovered (or re-discovered) 
PHAs.  Because the population is so large, and uncertainty so high, completion will 
take a very long time for this size bin, and warning times will remain very low for the 





Figure 29.  Close Approach Warning Times 1998-2011 D= 100-300 m. 
Note the high number of missed approaches, because so many PHAs in this size bin 
remain to be discovered.  Warning times for a only few approaches are greater than 1 




Figure 30.  Close Approach Warning Times 2026-2039 D= 100-300 m. 
Missed approaches are still high, overshadowing the also high number of approaches 
by newly discovered PHAs.  Many newly discovered PHAs in this size bin have high 





Figure 31.  Close Approach Warning Times 2054-2067 D= 100-300 m. 
By this time period there are slightly fewer missed penetrations, and penetrations by 
newly discovered PHAs continue.  The number of approaches with warning times over 
24 years, at 78, is fairly high compared to other size bins, but the percentage is very 
low. 
 
Projections were only carried out to 2067 for this project.  However, as 
discussed regarding table 5, if average rates of discovery continue for the foreseeable 
future, it would take 86.3 years (past 2011) to reach completion, without taking into 
account trajectory uncertainties.  Because uncertainties are high in this size bin, it could 
take several hundred years to reach completion of the population.  However, even 
before completion is reached, a great many objects will be discovered, yielding a good 
chance of finding an EI among them.  For this reason, the 100-300 m size bin may yield 




Figure 32.  3-D 0.05 AU Approach Warning Times 1984-2039, D= 100-300. 
This graph shows that progress will be slow for warning times in this size range.  On 
the left side, the total of missed approaches and new discoveries remains high well into 
the period of 2054-2067.  Most approaches even in 2054 will have less than 1 year of 
warning time.  If one of these turned out to be a potential EI, there would be little 
opportunity to employ the rest of the layers of defense.  However, this population also 
provides some opportunity for discovery of an EI with over 30 years warning time, due 
to the high discovery numbers relative to other size bins. 
Very Small PHAs ~ 25- 100 m 
 Because projections were only accomplished out to 2067, the Very Small PHAs 
of 25-100 m in diameter (~22.8< H<25.7) did not show any progress in terms of 
warning time for MOID penetration.  The number of missed approaches in each period 
is over 1,700, and the new and lost detections so high that it will take potentially an 
order of magnitude improvement in finding and tracking NEOs to consider this size  
viable for early warning. Yet this is also the bin containing the next most likely 
surprise EI (no warning) to cause damage somewhere on the Earth. 
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 It may take over a millennium to reach completion for this size bin, and to 
therefore have reliable warning for every penetration of the MOID.  However, counter 
intuitively, this size bin may still provide an EI with over 30 years of warning, simply 
because there are so many PHAs being discovered in this size range all the time, as 
discussed in the following section. 
The Next Known EI versus the Next Surprise Strike 
 Several of the graphs for the smaller objects previously shown have bimodal 
distributions, displaying both high number of MOID penetrations with under 1 year 
warning, and a high number with over 30 years warning time.  This illustrates the 
reality of the PHA targeting problem: there is a reasonable chance that the size bin will 
yield both an EI with over 30 years warning time as well as a surprise EI that strikes 
with very little, if any, warning.   
It is well known that the smaller the object is (down to 25 m), the more likely it 
will strike the Earth, because of the high numbers in the lower diameter populations.  
Our PHA population estimates in table 5 show over ~19,400- 400,000 PHAs in the 25-
100 m range, with over ~18,260-399,000 left to detect.  In the 100-300 m range, there 
are over 3,800, with over 3,300 left to detect.  This means that there is over an 83-99% 
chance that the next EI to strike without warning will come from the 25-100 m 
population of PHAs, followed by a 1-15% chance it will come from the 100-300 m 
bin.  There is an exceedingly small chance (<<1%) that the next surprise EI will be  
greater than 300 m, and this chance will continue to decline as the remaining 




However, determination of the size of the next EI to strike with over 30 years of 
warning time is more complex.  These must come from the population of discovered 
objects.  Small PHAs are discovered frequently.  Yet, as discussed in depth in Chapter 
II, a great number of small PHAs have too few observations to reliably predict their 
orbits for more than a couple of decades, and generally not out to 30 years.  The 
following table considers our previous estimates of discovery rates and uncertainty 
rates.  










rates (14 yr) 
9 47 193 539 1661 2448 
Est. Level 2 
PHAs 
0% 0% 48% 80% 95%  
Level 1 PHAs 9 47 100 109 84 349 
% next 
known EI: 
2.5% 13.5% 28.7% 31.2% 24.1% 100% 
Note: This table, with data pulled from previously explained tables 5 and 8, shows that 
three times as many PHAs are currently discovered in the 25-100 m bin as in the 100-
300 m bin.  And almost three times as many PHAs are discovered in the 100-300 m 
bin as in the 300-500 m bin.  Yet objects whose trajectories have high uncertainty are 
more common in the 25-100 m range (95%) than in the 100-300 m range (80%).  Once 
all objects with high uncertainty are removed from the discovery population, the 100-
300 m bin is left with 109 objects whose trajectories can be projected out to 2200.  
Only 84 objects have such certainty among the 25-100m size bin. 
 
 Estimates in the above table are discussed in the “Detection Rates for New 
Objects” section and the “Level 2 PHAs: High Orbital Uncertainties” section in 
Chapter II.  The main conclusions drawn from this analysis is that the next EI with 
over roughly 30 years of warning time has a fairly equal likelihood of being drawn 
from the 100-300 m, 300-500 m, or 25-100 m size bins, with the most likely to be 
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found in the 100-300 m size bin (31%).   This probability distribution will change in 
future periods, as the larger size bins reach completion.  Currently, if an EI with over 
30 years warning time is discovered in the next period, there a reasonable chance it 
could come from the 300-500 m bin (28%).   It should be emphasized that this does 
not mean there is a high chance of an impact for objects 300-500 m in diameter.  As 
Don Yeomans, manager of NASA’s NEO program office at the Jet Propulsion 
Laboratory explained to Space.com, for 500 meters (1640 feet), this is a mean interval 
of about 100,000 years. 
When you get down to 50 meters, the mean interval is about 700 years, and for 
30 meters, about 140 years or so, but by then you’re getting down to a size where you 
won’t expect any ground damage, as they burn up in the atmosphere at about 25 
meters in diameter and smaller, probably for an impressive fireball event.  (Choi, 
2009, p. 1)      
Dr. Yeoman’s statement above underscore that if an object is less than 25 
meters, there is little need to be concerned about the risk.  For this reason, this lower 
threshold was used throughout this analysis.  Objects above 25 m may, with the right 
composition and trajectories, make it through the atmosphere to cause impact the 
Earth.  Clearly, objects in the 25-100 m and 100-300 m size ranges have a higher 
chance of containing an EI than the population above 300 m.  However, when looking 
purely at the chance for finding an EI with over 30 years of warning time, the outlook 
changes somewhat.  The 100-300 m range may very well have the highest chance of 
yielding an EI with warning time over 30 years, but only slightly greater than the 
chance of such an EI coming from the 25-100 m range or the 300-500 m range.  
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The uncertainty in these answers lies principally in the estimates for the total 
number of PHAs in each size bin.  While the total number of NEOs have been 
estimated through simulation, the number of PHAs is still unknown, though there are 
some estimates stating that the total number of PHAs should be 21% of the number of 
NEOs (L. Johnson, personal communication, Feb 12, 2012).  Further refinement of 
these estimates would help reduce the error levels of this thesis.  However, the answer 
will still involve a high number of very small objects along with a high uncertainty in 
the trajectories of their orbits, yielding a low number of objects discovered with 
predictable orbits. 
One assumption in this analysis is that observation technology, techniques, 
funding, and focus of the scientific community will remain the same.  If the 
community decides that focusing on the small objects is not worthwhile, the time for 
survey completion could remain quite a long period.  However, if technology 






APPLICATION OF RESULTS:  MISSION CAMPAIGNS 
Subsequent Layers:  The Importance of a Transponder Mission 
Within the layered defense approach, our results show distributions of the time 
between detecting an object and its next close approach to the Earth as a parallel to 
impact warning times and as a time frame within which a decision must be made for 
further action.  As discussed in our overview at the beginning of this thesis, possible 
decisions to be made within the early warning period for each close approach include, 
in order of necessity: 
1.  Ignore the NEA.   
2.  Focus additional ground based telescopes at the NEA.   
3.  Focus RADAR assets on the NEA if possible. 
4.  Launch a precursor characterization/transponder mission.   
5.  Launch near-simultaneous observation and deflection missions.   
6.  Evacuation.   
7.  Recovery operations.    
Beyond the initial layer of knowing that an object is coming within the 0.05 AU 
MOID, the probabilities of impact must be further refined.  Additional ground 
observations, radar, and a precursor mission are the next layers. Possibly the most 
significant single piece of information that a precursor mission would need to 
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determine would be the answer to the questions “What are the odds of the object hitting 
us?”  There is a great deal of uncertainty in orbital refinements. Several passes of a 
NEO may be required before ground observations can tell if a NEO will have a high 
probability of being an EI.  Chesley and Spahr (2004) accomplished a case study of the 
“rate at which the probability of an impending impact increases after discovery” 
(Chesley & Spahr, 2004, p. 34).  In their simulation, an object discovered in 1983 and 
destined to hit in 2000 is determined to be harmless after initial observation.  Years 
later, when the object is again observable, the future impact is confirmed, leaving less 
time for deflection attempts (Chesley & Spahr, 2004, p. 35). 
A recent example of the application of this concept is 2011 AG5, an object 
which currently has the highest known chance of impacting the Earth (on its pass in 
2040).   The chance is estimated at 1 in 625.  “Processing additional observations in the 
2013-2016 time period,” Don Yeomans told space.com, “will almost certainly see the 
impact probability for 2011 AG5 significantly decrease.” (David, 2012, p. 1).  In this 
case, enough observational opportunity will exist for 2011 AG5 well prior to 2040 to 
ease the pressure on decision-makers.  However, if the next chance for observation was 
not until 2030 or 2035, the US government would have to decide if a 1 in 625 chance of 
impact merits launching a precursor transponder mission to the object. 
For this reason, the author advocates a multi-layered approach with defined 
probability levels past which the next stage is activated.  For example, a potential EI 
whose probability of impact reaches above some predefined amount should become the 
immediate subject of a global observation campaign, including RADAR observations.   
Once uncertainties are further resolved, if the NEA still provides a sufficient 
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probability of threat and enough time, the next stage should be implemented- that of an 
immediate, inexpensive and uncomplicated precursor transponder mission.  As the 
transponder mission is flying to the NEA, more expensive long-term transponder-
observation and deflection missions could be designed and assembled as necessary. 
Tens of billions of dollars could be spent to deflect or destroy a PHA presumed, 
incorrectly, to be on a collision course with the Earth.  For this reason, sending a 
transponder mission to a PHA with a reasonably high chance of being an EI might be 
essential for determining if the NEO is indeed an EI.  However, it is a difficult and 
politicized decision to determine the best minimum probability before such a mission is 
deemed necessary.  For example, if a PHA in the 140 m size range has a 1 in 625 
chance to strike, how long are NASA, congress, the President, and other nations likely 
to wait before taking action?  In our current fiscally constrained environment, if added 
ground observations are soon possible, clearly the proper decision is the wait.  
However, what if the same odds applied and no more ground-based observations would 
become available prior to the threatening flyby?  What level of risk are we willing to 
tolerate, and at what level do we make the hard decision to send a precursor mission?   
Decisions currently take place on a case by case basis, and no known NEO represents 
sufficiently high probability of near term impact to justify an expensive mission. But 
more ideally, there would be some minimum parameters above which the government 
would fund and mandate action, first in the form of a low-cost precursor observer-





Purpose of a Transponder/Observer Mission in the Targeting Cycle 
  As discussed, a precursor transponder mission could determine orbital 
parameters to such a degree that the EI is determined to no longer be a threat, 
potentially saving the international community from large expenditures related to 
deflection attempts.  Moreover, if the trajectory of the NEA is shown to be on a near 
miss with the Earth, deflection techniques might be better avoided, so as to not disturb 
the object and turn it into an EI.  And if deflection is necessary, a transponder would 
likely be required for any deflection attempts and for post-deflection observation to find 
out the level of success.  In the Air Force, this sort of post- impact assessment is 
analogous to “Battle Damage Assessment,” an essential part of the Air Force’s 
targeting cycle.   
 
Figure 33.  Joint Publication 3-60 “Joint Doctrine for Targeting”. 




Figure 33 contains a typical example of the unclassified joint targeting cycle. In 
my professional career, I was part of this targeting process during the intense 
Afghanistan bombing campaign in the months after 9-11, and also in weaponeering 
prior to the second Gulf War.  What is striking is how relevant this targeting cycle is to 
the NEA problem set.  Detecting, locating, and identifying NEAs is currently being 
carried out by Spaceguard, and would be further carried out by the precursor observer-
transponder mission.   The decision point in the target cycle, one would presume, must 
lie with the President and/or Congress with (currently) recommendations from NASA 
for funding a campaign of missions to the NEA.  Once deflection is attempted, 
assessment of the target would be required through the still active observer/transponder 
mission, after which a new decision for retargeting would take place. 
The first key element in any targeting cycle is to gain as much detailed 
information about the target as possible.  During the targeting of potential Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) going into the second Gulf War, a widespread assumption 
was that there was, indeed, WMD in Iraq.  This assumption, however, was not 
supported by all in the targeting community.  During subsequent congressional 
inquiries, it became apparent that no considerable amount of WMD existed, and an 
investigation began to find out how the error was allowed to propagate (Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2006, p. 4).  A critical series of informational errors had 
taken place, causing or allowing immense resources to be allocated towards a lengthy 
war. This serves as an example of how the early stages of targeting- ascertaining the 
true nature of the target- are without a doubt the most critical.   
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Subsequent important stages of the process include developing targeting 
packages that address the most likely characteristics of the target.  After adequate 
characterization, an attempt to destroy the target takes place, followed by another 
important process, assessment of the target after impact.  All of these must take place in 
the targeting of an EI. 
Characterization Data Necessary for Mitigation 
 Most importantly, a precursor observer- transponder mission could supply 
precise orbital parameters and mass/density distribution, due to the fact that these are 
required to determine whether the NEA is an EI, and if so, how much damage it can 
inflict.  Other important data needed include shape models, rotation rates, gravity 
distribution, moment of inertia, chemical composition, and internal structure. Prior to 
embarking on a precursor mission to obtain this data, all attempts from ground-
observation to yield as much data as possible should be carried out, both to determine 
the necessity of the precursor mission and to assist the mission, in the event that it must 
take place.   
Prior to sending a precursor mission, it is important to have a general idea of the 
size and mass of the threatening NEA. The most likely size will be in the 100-300 m 
range, with possibilities in the 300-500 m and 25-100 m ranges.  Close-proximity 
operations around small bodies such as these are complex.  Scheeres (2004) states that 
orbits about small bodies can become rapidly destabilized and result in impact or 
escape velocity in a matter of hours, rather than thousands to millions of years 
(Scheeres, 2004, p. 2). He emphasizes that small bodies, with their large range of 
physical parameters, will merit very different concepts in terms of close-proximity 
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operations.  He discusses a case study of the NEAR approach to Eros versus 
Hayabusa's approach to the smaller Itokawa.  These missions required substantially 
different designs due to vast differences in the bodies, particularly the mass difference.  
This meant that for Itokawa, the spacecraft used more station-keeping, in essence 
almost hovering around the object, which meant differences in terms of fuel, placement 
of instruments, and more (Scheeres, 2004, pp. 1-2).  Therefore, radar imaging and 
precise optical imaging of a NEO would be ideal prior to embarking on a threat 
mitigation mission or a precursor to that mission.   
Alternatives and Mission Times for a Precursor/Transponder Mission 
  A precursor transponder mission could involve placement of a device onto the 
surface of the NEO, or simply conducting long term close-proximity orbits of the object 
using a radio science package for distance measurements from Earth.  The mission 
could be designed for a direct short term stay near the body (a few years) using already 
developed technologies for costs that would be low relative to a deflection mission, 
which might be determined to be unneeded due to the refinement of the orbit.  Or it 
could be designed for more sophisticated, long-term stay for pre- and post- deflection 
purposes, which would likely cost more.  The design and test of an inexpensive, rapidly 
deployable precursor transponder mission would be a step in the right direction.  The 
precursor mission should be designed for objects in the 100-300 m range, based on this 
analysis.  Another  recommendation is continued design of a robust suite of observation 
and deflection missions that would follow the initial precursor mission.  Finally, testing 
of a kinetic deflector against a benign NEO in the 100-300 m size range would provide 
real world experience for planetary defense.   
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 Charania, Olds, and Koenig of Spaceworks carried out recent work on 
Foresight, an inexpensive precursor mission designed as an Apophis mission. The 
Planetary Society’s Apophis Mission Design Competition awarded first prize to the 
Foresight mission for its “low-cost, conventionally propelled orbiter with only two 
instruments and a single band [X-band] radio tracking system” (The Planetary Society, 
2008).  Spaceworks wrote a mission design document for a transponder mission that 
would co-orbit the sun with Apophis.  NASA scientists at JPL initially thought 
Apophis, a roughly 270 m object, had a reasonably high 2.7% chance of impacting the 
Earth in 2029 (Brown, 2009).  With additional observations, they were able to rule out 
the 2029 impact, but will be watching it closely as it passes very close to the Earth to 
the Earth at around 31,000 km (Brown, 2009), which is inside the orbit of our 
geosynchronous satellites.  Initially, scientists were also concerned that in 2029, “if 
Apophis passes through a several-hundred-meter-wide ‘keyhole’ in space during this 
approach, it will impact the Earth in 2036” (Charania, p. 1).   However, “updated 
computational techniques and newly available data indicate the probability of an Earth 
encounter on April 13, 2036 for Apophis has dropped from one-in-45,000 to about 
four-in-a million” (Brown, 2009).   Nevertheless, Apophis’ close passes to the Earth 
make it ideally suited for testing a transponder precursor mission.  
Wertz breaks down a spacecraft into the following subsystems: propulsion, 
control systems, on-board processing, communications and power, and structures and 
thermal, as well as payload, ground system, and launch operations (Wertz, 2011, pp. vi-
vii).  Looking at the Foresight mission for these elements, Charania uses “a single bi-
propellant chemical main engine and a number of small thrusters” for Foresight’s 
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propulsion (Charania, p. 2).  Ion propulsion has recently matured enough to where this 
might be the preferred mechanism (M. Gaffey, personal communication, 18 Apr, 2012). 
 On-board processing includes a central processing unit (PowerPC 750FX), a 
solid state drive, and an electronics module. Control systems include four reaction 
control system thrusters, several sun sensors, two star trackers, and an inertial 
measurement unit.  Foresight uses both high and low gain antennas for 
communications, and it has two solar arrays as its primary power source, augmented by 
batteries (Charania, p. 1).  For the payload design, Charania et al. felt that a laser 
altimeter and camera were “the minimum suite of instruments one would need in order 
to provide the data to reduce future orbital uncertainty (A. Charania, personal 
communication, December 4, 2012).  All of these fit into an 85 cm X 85 cm X 70 cm 
box, with a total mission cost estimate of only $131 M (FY2007 constant U.S. dollars) , 
including the $22 M stated for the Minotaur IV launch vehicle.  For the launch, 
Charania used a Propulsive Transfer Vehicle (PTV), “a simple bi-propellant chemical 
stage, to assist in achieving the necessary Earth departure velocity”, after initial launch 
on an Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) Minotaur IV launch vehicle from Wallops 
Flight Facility in Virginia (Charania, pp. 1-2).   
 The Foresight would, if launched on May 9, 2012, take 310 days to transfer 
from Earth to Apophis, followed by a 10 day Initial Survey period and a 30 day 
Observation period during which it would orbit Apophis to determine its shape, 
rotation, and gravity model.  It would then retreat from orbiting Apophis and enter a 
trailing orbit 2 km behind the asteroid’s center of mass, for the modeled minimum of 
300 days required to reduce the error ellipse down to 6 km (Charania, pp. 3-4).  Added 
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together, this would yield 650 days for mission success, plus a waiting time for the 
window of approximately 5 years after the initial design, for a total of approximately 7 
years’ time to mission success after the proposal.   
 This 7-year time to mission success provides a direct link in to the warning time 
estimations.  After ground –based instruments determine some minimum chance of a 
NEA being an EI, we can see that the precursor transponder mission alone will 
consume a sizeable chunk of time.  Bruce Willis would age perhaps a decade or more 
before being able to board the Space Shuttle and rocket off with a nuclear weapon.  
Early warning is vital. 
The second (A-Track) and third-prize (APEX) competitors estimated their costs 
at $387.2 M and $497.8 M respectively.  A-Track proposed a payload of 2 cameras, a 
thermal radiometer, a visual and near-IR spectrometer, and a dual band (Ka and X) 
tracking system.  It was larger and more massive than Foresight (540.2 kg versus 100.2 
kg), with a correspondingly larger solar panel size (6 m2 versus 1.2 m2).  A-Track 
proposed a 2013 or 2014 launch on a Boeing Delta II 7926, with rendezvous at Apophis 
10-15 months later.  Like Foresight, it would orbit Apophis for a preliminary period (5 
months, longer than Foresight’s 30 days).  However, in lieu of leaving orbit to trail 
behind Apophis, Deimos Space, the creators of A-Track, proposed having the 
spacecraft withdraw to a stable orbit, well-away from Apophis, further out for a six-
month tracking period (The Planetary Society, 2008).  Again, with the waiting time for 




APEX, the most expensive of the three winners was a solar-electric propelled 
spacecraft that would be theoretically launched on a Soyuz Fregat between 2012 and 
2015, to arrive 9 to 21 months later.  Like the other two, it would arrive and accomplish 
a preliminary study of the asteroid’s parameters, with added capabilities due to its 
extensive sensor suite of six instruments: 2 cameras, a laser altimeter, a visible and 
near-IR spectrometer, and an accelerometer, along with a dual band (KA and X) 
tracking system.  With this more sophisticated instrument suite, EADS can accomplish 
a thermal mapping campaign for what it argues are essential estimates of the Yarkovski 
effect and Solar Radiation Pressure (SRP) on both Apophis and the spacecraft.  APEX 
would track Apophis for at least an Apophis year after its initial observation period, 
with a potential additional year under some conditions (Allouis, et al., 2007, pp. 1-5).  
The total time to mission success for APEX is on the order of 5-7 years when adding 
launch window wait time to transit time and mission completion time.di 
Proposed Campaign Architecture 
For a 100-300 m object with warning time of over 30 years, the use of a mission 
similar to one of the above Planetary Society winning proposals for an inexpensive 
rapidly deployed precursor mission would be desirable.  Secondly, a more robust 
observation mission to follow is advocated, should the initial precursor mission 
demonstrate conclusively that a NEA is indeed an EI.  This mission would be required 
to loiter near the NEA, providing similar transponder and other characterization data as 
the above missions, with the potential addition of an observation role during and after a 
potential mitigation attempt.  This follow-on precursor campaign would either require a 
more robust power source to keep it active for a longer period, or it would need to 
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involve of a series of inexpensive observer spacecraft that would be launched 
periodically to replace and/or augment previous observer missions. 
  Rather than orbit the NEA, or after doing so for a period of time, the spacecraft 
would pull back and co-orbit the sun in close proximity to the NEA, far enough from it 
so that a deflection mission would not adversely affect it.  This might not be too 
complicated if the deflection method chosen were a kinetic strike or the use of a gravity 
tractor.  However, the use of a nuclear bomb as a deflection device may create 
complexity in terms of the radiation effects on the spacecraft.  The degree of hardening 
and distance from the center of mass of the NEA might require modeling, likely based 
on models used within the Department of Energy and DoD for modeling nuclear blasts.  
A solution for preparing for such an environment might be to have the observation 
mission positioned on the opposite side of the NEA from the blast.  Because there is no 
atmosphere involved, this could very well be enough to protect the spacecraft (M. 
Gaffey, personal communication, 18 Apr 2012).  
Alternatively, a new transponder mission could be launched to arrive shortly 
after the mitigation mission.  The campaign would include a means of initial scouting 
(the precursor), a follow-up long term observation mission, the mitigation, and the 
critical post-mitigation assessment-observation mission.  After deflection attempts, a 
critical period would ensue to re-measure the orbit of the NEA, with the hopes that it 
shifted enough.   
If warning times are less than 30 years, the multiple spacecraft in this campaign 
might be sent near simultaneously.  For this reason, an already designed, inexpensive 
precursor mission, ready for rapid launch would be an important part of such a 
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campaign architecture.  With 10 years warning time, for example, the precursor would 
launch as soon as a certain probability for impact threshold is reached, and as soon as a 
window became available, completing its mission within the next 7 years.  The follow-
on observer mission and mitigation missions would be built in a crash program similar 
to the Apollo program to get to the moon, and might be sent while the precursor is still 
enroute. 
The Most Likely Target 
 Such a transponder mission and/or campaign of several spacecraft, if launched 
within the next few decades to centuries, would most likely be sent to an object in the 
100-300 m range, as the research in this thesis points to.  If observation technology 
advances significantly, so that uncertainty rates for smaller objects decline 
significantly, then the most likely object for a transponder mission would move to the 
25-100 m range.  With the high frequency of discoveries in this very small object 
range, the only thing preventing an EI from being discovered is the uncertainty in its 
trajectories.  Until these uncertainties are overcome, the next detected EI giving any 
time for a transponder mission will most likely come from the 100-300 m range, 
followed by the 300-500 m range, and then the 25-100 m range.  Therefore, close-
proximity operations may be designed around these three general size ranges, and the 
corresponding likely mass.  While the mass range between 25 m and 500 m is 
significant, it is far better constrained than trying to design for larger NEAs.  This 
means that the mission designs for Apophis, if tested, would provide proven technology 




The next EI with actionable warning times (greater than 30 years) will most 
likely come from the 100-300 m size bin, followed by the 300-500 m size bin, and 
lastly the 25-100 m size bin.  This conclusion came from a combination of estimates of 
approach warning times, missed approaches, rates of occurrence of highly uncertain 
orbits, and projected detection rates.  Possible campaigns for dealing with potential EIs 
discovered with enough actionable warning time to launch a precursor mission were 
discussed.  Examples of mission designs for the initial precursor transponder mission 
were discussed, as well as a proposed campaign for follow-on observation and 
deflection missions, using the Department of Defense Joint Targeting Cycle as a model 
for carrying out such a deflection mission. A discussion of some technologies that 
should probably be improved over the next few decades follows, along with a synopsis 
of recommended paths forward to prepare for the different threats the Earth will face. 
Future Technologies Essential to Spaceguard 
This analysis has attempted to help focus the planetary defense efforts on 
current capabilities and help identify gaps in them.  One such gap comes from the high 
uncertainties for the orbits of most objects less than 300 m, which, if overcome, will 
rapidly ramp up the warning time for these objects.  Until this is rectified, there will be 
a substantial threat of little to no warning for many objects in the 100-300 m size-bin
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 for several decades.  For objects 25-100 m, this threat will remain for several centuries, 
unless several order of magnitude improvements take place in observation technology 
(ground and space-based).  The following technologies should be maintained, and 
improved if possible. 
Radar Observations 
Arecibo, at 300 m in diameter, is the most sensitive radar system in the world, 
although it cannot be steered as well as the runner-up, NASA’s Deep Space Network 
70 meter antenna in California.  The Arecibo radar has carried out 65% of all radar 
observations of NEOs, discovered 47% of known binary NEOs, and provided data for 
higher precision orbit determination for a significant number of NEOs  (Campbell, 
2007, p. 2). But even with these impressive statistics, Arecibo faced the prospect of 
being closed down, until Congress allocated funds to NASA with the charge to keep it 
running. 
New Methods of Surveying 
Detection methods have advanced greatly in recent years. Chesley and Spahr 
(2003) noted that “surveys will most readily detect impactors  . . . in two fairly small 
‘sweet spots’ situated within 15° of the ecliptic and 90-120° from opposition.  Fainter 
objects will be preferentially found in the opposition region” (p. 36).  This has heralded 
a new focus on observing in areas outside of opposition, yielding great results.  
Dr. Spahr states that what we need is a “consistent survey to visual magnitudes 
(V) of 23 or 24, or a dedicated follow-up system that can get us to V = 24 quickly.”  (T. 
Spahr, personal communication, March 1, 2012).  He and other scientists involved in 
Spaceguard have a wealth of understanding of the potential for improvements in 
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existing technology.  Surveying methods also need to work well with the overall goal 
of finding objects that might strike Earth.  Spahr explains that we need a way to flag the 
NEAs that we are interested in and focus observations on them “at the discovery 
apparition. Then key objects won’t ever get lost” (T. Spahr, personal communication, 
March 1, 2012). 
Diversion of just a few percent of funds from a major DOD or DHS program, 
which may provide only marginal increases in national security considering our large 
lead in that area, could enable huge dividends in planetary defense and inspire more 
scientists to pursue space-related research. 
New Space-Based Observations 
Scientists such as Dr. Mainzer at JPL have made efforts for more space-based 
observations in the IR, with proposed projects such as NEOCAM.  NEOCAM will, if 
approved, attempt to observe at low solar elongations. (A. Mainzer, personal 
communication, September 26, 2011).  With such technology, current efforts might 
more quickly lead to a precursor mission to a small EI destined for impact decades to 
centuries from now.  A space-based constellation added to increased ground-based 
technology, with automated target recognition and tracking technology, might also be a 
means to handle the tremendous number of objects in the smallest of size bins, which 
contains most likely next surprise impactor.  Space-based assets can provide more 
precise orbits of objects, due to being above atmospheric distortions and potentially 
positioned better for observations.  This would be a valuable addition for detection of 
small objects, in the 25-100 m and 100-300 m range.  As astronaut Rusty Schweickart 
stated in a 2007 testimony to congress:  
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It is an unfortunate reality that ground-based telescopic tracking produces, for 
many challenging NEOs, discontinuous information; data dropouts may last for 
several years at a time. . .The orbital phasing responsible for this interrupted 
tracking can be eliminated by selecting any of several space-based search 
options in NASA’s analysis to augment the ground-based systems.  While 
NASA reports that overall costs for space and ground tracking are comparable 
(a controversial claim), the tracking quality provided by a telescope in a Venus-
like orbit, in particular, is vastly superior.  The dual-band IR telescope is 
especially preferable since it also improves greatly our estimates of NEO mass 
(and thus impact energy) (Schweickart, 2007, pp. 57-58) . 
Recommendations 
The following two charts represents our conclusions and recommended actions 
for possible scenarios occurring out to 2200.  The top entry (Highest, High, Medium, 
Low, Negligible), gives their general estimate for the likelihood of that scenario taking 
place within this time frame.  Recommended actions after the discovery of the 
impending EI are provided.  Finally, recommendations for what to do to prepare for 
each eventuality are provided, to include recommendations against preparing for 
negligible chance events.  For example, the highest probable scenario is that of a 25-
100 m object striking with no warning.  The only actions available are recovery, and 
potentially an attempt at last minute evacuation.  Recommendations for reducing this 
danger include improvements to detection and tracking technologies (through space- 
and ground-based technologies), and preparations for recovery from such an event 
within the emergency management system.  Objects in this size range have a low 
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probability of being detected long in advance because of the difficulties in resolving 
their orbits.  In the 100-300 m range, there is a lower total chance of a surprise EI 
within this smaller population.  However, the number of discoveries in this size bin is 
quite high, so if an EI is in this population, there is a moderate chance of finding it well 
in advance of its strike.  Objects in this size range are numerous enough and pose 
enough damage potential to merit recommending an on-call pre-built precursor mission 
ready to deploy to the object quickly, followed by more long-term planning of a host of 
pre- and post-observing missions and deflection missions.  Another strong 
recommendation is for the testing of a live deflection mission against such a small 
NEA, albeit one that could not be deflected such that it would later hit the Earth!   
Table 15.  Actions and Preparatory Recommendations by Size, Warning Times  
(<300 m). 
  Warning → → 
  Size/Danger 
0- 1 year  
          warning 
1- 30 years  
             warning 
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- .3% high death 


































1. RADAR ground 
observation 
2. Precursor mission 





- On-call precursor 
mission pre-built 
- Design observation/ 
mitigation missions 
- Conduct kinetic 
deflection tests in space 
Action:  
1. Extended RADAR/ 
ground observation 
2. Precursor mission 




- Conduct space mission 
design for precursor 
missions to small PHAs 
- Conduct kinetic deflection 
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  Warning → → 
Size/Danger 
0- 1 year → → 
       warning 
1- 30 years → → 
          warning 
































2. Immediate precursor 
mission 




- On-call precursor 
mission built 
- Design  & Test 
observation 
mitigation missions 
Most likely size group 
 
Action:  
1. RADAR/ ground 
observation 
2. Precursor 
3.  Observation + 
mitigation msn 
Recommend: 
-On-call precursor mission 
-Design Observation/ 
mitigation missions 
Note: The first column contains PHA size and estimate of damage levels.  The second contains, at the 
top, a ranking of this event occurring within the next several centuries, and actions to take if it does 
occur.  It also contains recommended advanced preparations to take to prepare for and prevent such an 
event.  The third and fourth columns contain the same, for longer warning time periods.  The highest 
chance event is a surprise EI under 100 m.  A medium probability event is a 100-300 m EI with a very 
long warning time (30-1000 year). 
 
Events in the 300 m and larger size bins have low to negligible chances of 
occurring; however, damage/death rates become so high projecting out all current orbits 
for several millennia would be a very good step to allow for very long term observation 
and mitigation planning.   
Crash mitigation- observer missions (missions designed with urgency and very 
little time) should be designed for objects in the 100-300 m range and the 25-100 m 
range, in that order of precedence.  Such crash missions would include near- 
simultaneous low-budget solar-powered precursor missions accompanied by higher-
budget observer and mitigation missions.  Emergency management agencies such as 
FEMA should design evacuation plans and post-impact recovery plans for objects in 
the 25-100 m and 100-300 m range, in that order of precedence.  For objects greater 
than 500 m, emphasis should be on continuing to accelerate the discovery and orbital 
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prediction for this limited population of NEAs out several centuries, to allow adequate 
time for several deflection attempts. 
Table 16. Actions and Preparatory Recommendations by Size, Warning Times 
 (>300 m). 
  Warning → → 
Size/Danger 
0- 1 year  
           warning 
1- 30 years  
             warning 
30- 1000 years  
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Summary and Conclusions 
Throughout this analysis, the Department of Defense targeting cycle was 
applied to the EI challenge.  This application began with characterizing early warning 
times for different size objects.  An attempt was made to measure the success of the 
Spaceguard efforts in increasing warning times for different size bodies, and along with 
projections for future warning times for penetration of the 0.05 AU MOID.  In doing 
so, a multi-step method to build a model consisting of aggregated differences in the 
dates of first discovery and close approach was carried out, along with estimates for 
missed approaches, projections of new discoveries, and estimates for high uncertainty 
trajectory rates.  Conclusions for PHAs of different sizes were provided.  The most 
significant of these conclusions was that the 100-300 m size range contains the most 
likely EI we will discover with enough warning time to take some form of action.   
Also provided were time frames as to when populations would reach enough 
completion that a high percentage of 0.05 AU MOID warning times would grow to 
greater than 30 years. 
In the second half of the analysis, mission campaigns based on the results of the 
first were discussed, to include specific focus on use of a precursor transponder mission 
against small objects, likely in the 100-300 m size range.  Recommendations against 
different EI scenarios were provided, given different warning times and sizes.  Overall, 
the recommended campaigns included additional observation technology; an 
inexpensive short-termed precursor transponder mission; a long-term observation 
mission; and a suite of simultaneous observation and mitigation missions.  A 
conclusion is that additional resources should be allocated toward more robust survey  
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technology, the first layer of defense, with continued development of precursor 
characterization-transponder mission technology, the second layer of defense.   
Another conclusion is that the Spaceguard effort has brought about the 
beginnings of a true targeting process that could either be maintained within NASA or 
spread out among the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security in 
some ways, against the day that mitigation of an EI becomes a real necessity.  NASA 
began a process in 1998 that could result in an eventual successful mitigation of an EI.  
However, without “finishing the job”, by far the most likely scenario, that of a small 
object penetrating and striking with negligible warning time, will still occur.  It is quite 
possible, in fact that two situations will occur within the next few centuries.  It is quite 
possible that we will find and attempt to mitigate the threat of an EI with decades to 
centuries of warning time (100-300 m diameter), and in the meantime have another 
smaller EI (25-100 m diameter) hit us without warning.  Now that the technology is 
viable and the effort is expanding, the President and Congress would best serve our 
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